Barrier Analysis In Antitrust Law by Disner, Eliot G.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 5 June 1973 Article 2
Barrier Analysis In Antitrust Law
Eliot G. Disner
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eliot G. Disner, Barrier Analysis In Antitrust Law , 58 Cornell L. Rev. 862 (1973)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol58/iss5/2
BARRIER ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LAW*
Eliot G. Disnert
The ideal analysis of alleged antitrust law violations should in-
clude all significant economic factors bearing on anticompetitive activ-
ity in the marketplace. However, certain economic factors are often
ignored by legal commentators. Barriers to entry has been one of them.'
Barriers to entry are the conditions or devices of a specific industry
which tend to keep out prospective competitors. They may be thrust
upon an industry as a necessary consequence of its operation, or they
may be created whole cloth by industry members who are actively
seeking to discourage new competition.2 The classic analysis describes
three kinds of barriers: economies of scale, absolute cost advantages,
and product differentiation advantages.3 Advertising intensity4 and the
size of existing firms have also been regarded as separate barriers to
entry.
Firms may reflect the presence of these barriers by making pricing
* The views here expressed are those of the author alone, and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission.
t Member of the Michigan Bar; Attorney for the Federal Trade Commission. B.A.
1969, University of Michigan; J.D. 1972, Harvard University.
1 An extensive search of legal periodicals has uncovered only one article considering
the interrelationship between entry barrier theory and legal precedent. That article
primarily deals with low barriers as a defense to antitrust actions. See Low, Ease of
Entry: A Fundamental Economic Defense in Merger Cases, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 515
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Low].
2 Barriers to entry have been alternatively defined as:
The... obstacles that impose on newcomers higher costs per unit than those en-
countered by the established firms, or disadvantages that compel newcomers to
sell their product for a lower price per unit than established firms can get for a
product of comparable quality.
Mueller, The New Antitrust: A "Structural" Approach, I ANTrrrusr L. 9- EcoN. REV.,
Winter 1967, at 87, 89 n.7. This definition views barriers from a common, but technically
fallacious, vantage point. A barrier, in both operation and theory, denies entry, making
the appellation "newcomer" and any characterization of costs and prices misplaced. More
accurately, what Mueller has defined are handicaps to new competition. This definition
may still be helpful for measuring entry barriers and predicting higher per unit costs or
lower per unit revenues by would-be entrants. It is such predictions that actually
discourage entry.
3 See, e.g., J. BAIN, BARiuaas To NEiw CoMa'rrMoN 14 (1956) [hereinafter cited as
BAIUUERS].
4 Advertising is frequently placed in the product differentiation category. However,
it may also exhibit, in a pronounced manner, the properties of other barriers. It will,
therefore, be considered separately in this article. See notes 109-25 and accompanying text
infra.
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decisions5 intended to discourage new entry into the industry.6 The
higher the barriers, the less likely new entry will occur, and hence the
less existing competitors will be affected in their pricing and other de-
cisions by the threat of such entry.7 In this way, the power to exclude
potential competitors may be a significant element in the destruction
of presently effective competition.8
Entry barriers have not received the recognition they deserve.
Moreover, when they have been recognized, it frequently has been in a
random, slipshod manner. However, if the analysis of barriers to entry
could be made more uniform and comprehensible to judges, entry
barriers would be accorded a more merited, prominent role in proving
and disproving anticompetitive activity.
I
UTriTy OF BAUE.. ANALYsIs
No one disputes the importance of barriers to entry as an element
of market structure.9 What is disputed is the relative importance that
barriers assume in accounting for anticompetitive conditions and the
role that barrier theory should play in determining antitrust violations.
The courts ° and some economists" have leaned heavily on a market
share and concentration 12 approach to prove anticompetitive activity.
While present competition reflected in market share analysis is signifi-
cant, the threat of potential competition can exert a major, sometimes
the major, influence in limiting any anticompetitive effects on present
competition.'8 Firms make pricing decisions and other business judg-
5 Such decisions might require pricing agreements among existing competitors, which
are directly prohibited by § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6 Cf. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 255 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BAIN].
7 Cf. Low 540.
8 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMmnr"EE To STuDY TnE ANTnRusr LAWs,
REPORT 327 (1955).
9 See, e.g., R. CAVES, AmERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUar, PmoRaRMANcE 34 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as CAVES].
10 see, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (presumptive violations established by
achievement of set market share).
11 See generally BARRRS 217-18.
12 Concentration is simply the addition of the market shares of the largest firms in
an industry. BamN 78.
13 See, e.g., Greenhut, An Economic Theory for Use in Antitrust Cases, 7 Hous'roN
L. REV. 318 (1970). In an effort which is somewhat recherch&, Professor Greenhut uses
the framework of spatial economics to conclude that in oligopolistic industries the preven-
tion of collusion and the dissolution of entry barriers are the most important factors
triggering competitive behavior. Id. at 323-25.
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ments recognizing the likely response of potential market entrants.
Particularly in a noncompetitive, oligopolistic setting, firms may adjust
their activities to accommodate comfortably the existing competitors
and their practices. But the threat of new competitors may make firms
somewhat more cautious about acting like traditional oligopolists.141
Thus, the higher the barriers to entry, the less existing firms need be
constrained by the threat of new entry, and the more likely they will
be able to maintain their relative market power without deviating from
profit-maximization principles. 15
If high barriers and high industry market shares were always found
together, then the preoccupation with market shares would be justified,
even if it were the barriers and not high market shares that caused the
prohibited anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, if a firm's high market
share alone caused the prohibited conduct, then courts would be jus-
tified in ignoring entry considerations entirely.
Although market share is highly correlated with the height
of entry barriers, 6 the correlation is not perfect. In an industry where
a high correlation between entry barriers and market share does not
exist, market share analysis must show anticompetitive behavior if
it is to be an effective test device. Such analysis, however, is not always
14 C. WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 7-8 (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 21, 1940); Turner, Advertising and Competition, 26 FED. BJ. 93, 94 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Turner]. See also Hearings on Monopoly Power Before the Sub-
comm. on the Study of Monopoly Power of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess., ser. 14, pt. 2B, at 815-16 (1949) (statement of H. Steinkraus, President of
the United States Chamber of Commerce).
As to the effect of low barriers on oligopolists where an attack on concentration fails,
Mueller concludes:
I]here is a "second line of defense" against the harmful effects of ... collective
monopolization-that even though the battle to prevent undue concentration has
been lost, the actual fruits of victory, low prices and high output, can still be
squeezed from the industry if the entry barriers around it can be kept sufficiently
low.
Mueller, supra note 2, at 111 (emphasis in original). Mueller's "lost battle" may realistically
be a planning one, to wit, the decision not to issue a complaint seeking market restructure.
It can hardly be expected that if litigation fails to prove anticompetitive conditions merit-
ing a divestiture remedy that the prosecuting agency will regroup and litigate for a less
exhaustive order. It is possible, though, that a planner would seek a less ambitious com-
plaint ab initio.
15 REPORT, supra note 8, at 824; cf. F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1971) [hereinafter cited as SCHERER]. "[S]ignificant entry barriers
are the sine qua non of monopoly and oligopoly, for... sellers have little or no enduring
power... when entry barriers are non-existent." Id. at 10.
16 BAIN 257, 299. The tire, gypsum products, and metal containers industries, for
example, are all highly concentrated, but have relatively low entry barriers. Mann, Seller
Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries 1950-1960, 48
Ryv. ECON. & STATS. 296, 299 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Mann].
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effective. High market share and concentration alone do not always
show anticompetitive conditions. Such conditions may prevail even in
the absence of high concentration.1 7 Although courts may spuriously
label a firm's conduct anticompetitive, using market share analysis,'
logic might suffer less if more attention were paid to entry barriers.
Even if reliance upon market share analysis proves well-placed, it
is an unwieldy test, and its application is likely to precipitate lengthy
disputes relating to definition and measurement.19 Moreover, without
a careful definition of the appropriate market, market share analysis
is "whimsy"20 and likely to be arbitrary.2 ' To avoid the possibilities of
inaccuracy and unfairness, it would be wise to place greater emphasis
on more reliable barrier analysis when market share analysis is un-
reliable. When entry barriers and market share seem equally indica-
tive of anticompetitive effect, the opportunity to do this safely is avail-
able.22
17 See C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUSr POLICY 101-06 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
KAYSEN & TumER]; Rathbone, A Businessman's View of Some Antitrust Problems-Partic-
ularly Mergers, Acquisitions and Corporate Size, 27 ABA ANrTusr SECrION 47, 50-52
(1965); cf. Shepherd, The Elements of Market Structure, 54 Rav. ECON. & STATS. 25, 30
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Shepherd]. Professor Shepherd showed a high correlation be-
tween market share and profits, but very little between concentration and profits. High
profits is a shorthand, although not an exclusive, way of identifying anticompetitive
market conditions.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 467 (1964). Mr. Justice
Harlan criticized the Court's simplistic, heavy-handed use of market share analysis. Id. at
467-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting); cf. BARuuits 181 (workable competition "quite conceivable"
even with high concentration).
19 For example, in A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962), both
definition and measurement of the appropriate baseball markets were hotly disputed and
dealt with in excruciating detail. See also Hall & Phillips, Antimerger Criteria: Power,
Concentration, Foreclosure and Size, 9 VmLL. L. REv. 211, 229 (1964) (use of market defini-
tion in merger cases criticized).
20 KAYSEN & TuRaNE 134.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). In Pabst, the
Justice Department sought to force the divestment of Blatz Brewing Company by Pabst
Brewing Company under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). The Supreme Court
split three ways in trying to decide how the market ("line of commerce") should be de-
fined geographically. Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, criticized the majority's
apparent refusal to hew to the line of "commercial realities" in setting geographic market
boundaries. 384 U.S. at 556. He noted that the possibilities for "gerrymandering" would
thereafter be "limitless." Id. The case demonstrates that uncertainties of market definition
may seriously jeopardize accurate appraisal of anticompetitive conduct and vitiate the
worth of market share analysis. It is further clear that the uncertainites tied to such
analysis are not limited to the problem of geographical demarcation. See also United States
v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); H. EINHORN & W. SMrrH, ECONOMIC AsPEafS
or ANTrRusr 404-05 (1968).
22 Barriers are not without their own measurement problems, but measurement of
barriers may not be as important to their use.
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This is not to suggest that barrier theory cannot independently be
a viable determinant of anticompetitive activity. Although the evidence
is mixed, there are indications of its usefulness. Industry profits, a
widely-used indicator of competitiveness, bear some relation to entry
barriers. At least one writer has demonstrated the independent influ-
ence of entry barriers over profits. Dr. H. Michael Mann, in his up-
date2 of Professor Joe Bain's classic study,24 found that profits in highly
concentrated industries were higher when entry barriers were higher,25
and that higher profits tended to be maintained over time by industries
with higher entry barriers. 2 However, he found no correlation between
lower barriers and profit rates.27 This may demonstrate merely that
blockaded entry can raise profits, or it may point out the problems in
measuring the height of all but the most blatant barriers.2S It may also
show that businessmen do not themselves perceive or act on the lower,
although protective, barriers present in their industries, or contrarily,
that they practice limit pricing which keeps out entrants but reduces
profits.2 9
Professor William G. Shepherd's recent study of 231 firms, in
which he related various market elements to profits, neither adds to nor
detracts from the above observations30 Generally, he concluded that
entry barriers were minimally related to profits 1 Market share had
five times the power of barriers in determining high profits. 2 Never-
theless, even within this finding there are indications of the relative
importance of entry barriers. First, Shepherd found high barriers "con-
sistently positive and significant" in relation to profits.3 3 Second, like
Mann and Bain, he was unable to conclude that lower barriers play any
role in profitability, but he may have faced the same uncertainties of
measurement that plagued Bain. Indeed, Shepherd remarked that the
results probably understated the significance of barriers since their
measurement was "nonscalar and approximate." 34
23 See generally Mann.
24 See generally BARuuEas.
25 Mann 300.
26 Mann, A Note on Barriers to Entry and Long Run Profitability, 14 ANrrrausr
BuLL. 845 (1969).
27 Mann 300.
28 See BMAN 456-57.
29 In theory, limit pricing would achieve its greatest use in industries with inter-
mediate barriers to entry. BMAN 275. See notes 140-42 and accompanying text infra.
30 Shepherd 25,
31 Id. at 80, 85.
32 Id. at 34.
33 Id. This supports the findings of Bain and Mann. See BAIN 456; Mann 300. See
also note 25 and accompanying text supra.
34 Shepherd 34.
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Third, for some reason Shepherd separated "advertising intensity"
from his barriers category. As will be shown below,3 5 advertising in-
tensity is a significant, in some industries the most significant, entry
barrier. Not surprisingly, Shepherd found advertising to be strongly
correlated with profits.36 Particularly in consumer-goods industries, it
is unrealistic to evaluate entry barriers without giving prime considera-
tion to the intensity of advertising. Finally, Shepherd conceded that,
despite his findings about entry barriers, "their descriptive and theoret-
ical uses may still be important."3 7
Significance also may be attached to entry barriers for reasons un-
related to profit rates. Lower barriers permit the entry of new firms
which frequently bring along innovative and constructive production
techniques3 8 Established firms have been characterized as frequently
"backward... conservative in approach and relatively unreceptive to
totally new ideas. '"39 New firms, however, often adopt the innovative
techniques which bring about technological advances. 40 Further, such
advances themselves can increase the breadth of the industry and create
more competitive conditions. 41
Preserving penetrable barriers also serves the congressionally im-
plied purpose of encouraging small-scale entry (the expressed purpose
being to encourage small business).42 For example, Senator Kefauver,
co-sponsor of the 1950 amendment to the Clayton Act, said at that
time:
35 See notes 109-25 and accompanying text infra.
36 Shepherd 32. Shepherd found advertising only moderately less correlated with
profits than market share. Id. at 31, Table 3 (market share .34, advertising intensity .22
(relation to profits)).
.37 Id. at 35. Professor Scherer, reviewing the literature up to the time of Shepherd's
analysis, concluded, "MTjhe results show rather forcefully that the ability of firms . . . to
earn supra-normal profits is related positively to the height of entry barriers." ScHma 282.
It also has been implied that high entry barriers are responsible for increased con-
centratibn in certain industries. Mueller found that concentration over time was falling
in the producer-goods sector, but rising in the consumer-goods sector, and rising to the
highest levels in "those industries that sell 'highly differentiated' products." Mueller,
Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called Product Differentiation, 18 AM. U.L.
REv. 1, 15-21 (1968). Product differentiation, it will be shown, is the most virulent strain
of entry barrier. See notes 97-108 and accompanying text infra.
38 CAVES 100. See also SCHERER 377.
39 CAVES 100.
40 Professor Caves notes that neither Bell Telephone nor General Electric initially
displayed any interest in the development of the radio. Id.
41 2 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUSr Poucms 409 (1958). Dr. Whitney cites the movie theatre
industry, which experienced considerable new entry with the advent of drive-ins. Id.
42 Cf. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 825 (9th Cir. 1961): "Congress was
not concerned about increased efficiency; it was concerned about the competitor-the small
businessman .... Accord, United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
1973]
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[I]f our democracy is going to survive in this country, we must
keep competition, and we must see to it that the basic materials and
resources of the country are available to any little fellow who wants
to go into business. 43
Representative Celler, the other sponsor of that amendment, cited the
inability of "ambitious young men" to enter the soap, automobile,
whiskey and tobacco industries as evidence of the need for strengthened
antimonopoly measures. 44
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States45 the Supreme Court viewed
the interest of Congress as being "with the protection of competition,
not competitors."46 This language would also seem to preclude any
special policy to protect would-be competitors. However, the Court
noted that Congress also intended that competition be promoted
through the preservation of small businesses, even if occasional higher
costs should prevail,47 and that entry barriers should be considered in
reviewing the structure of a specific industry.48 New businesses are fre-
quently small, and their protection on the brink of entry should be
within the ambit of the expressed policy protecting small businesses
already in the market. Therefore, the importance of barriers to entry
should sometimes loom larger as a judicial matter than even economic
analysis would allow.
Barrier analysis would also highlight the often aggressive nature
of anticompetitive activity and would force courts to tailor their
decrees to the more obvious and affirmative practices of unfair compe-
tition. There has been, for example, considerable criticism of the
ostensible judicial attitude that bigness alone begets anticompetitive
conduct.49 Insofar as pricing liberties are taken or other practices are
used to shut out prospective entrants from the market, the barrier
approach may pinpoint infractions more rationally than the seemingly
obtuse standard of bigness.
Some barriers, such as scale economies and certain cost advantages,
43 Hearings, supra note 14, ser. 14, pt. 13, at 12 (1949) (statement of Senator
Kefauver).
44 Id. at 15 (statement of Representative Celler). He remarked specifically that "only
one with the wealth of Croesus would compete" against the "Big Three" automakers. Id.
45 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
46 Id. at 320 (emphasis in original).
47 Id. at 344.
48 Id. at 322.
49 Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). See
generally Berghoff, The Size Barrier in, Merger Law-Or Antitrust by the Numbers, 27
Omno ST. L.J. 76 (1966). Contra, Berry, Corporate Bigness and Diversification in Manu-
facturing, 28 OMo ST. L.J. 402 (1967).
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may naturally characterize the established company and may be diffi-
cult, as well as undesirable, to combat. Courts should treat natural
barriers differently than barriers which firms affirmatively erect them-
selves. Anticompetitive activity could be checked without requiring
divestments and major industry upheavals if courts excised only those
practices which are disclosed by barrier analysis to be within the of-
fending firm's control.50 For example, cornering the market for a scarce
resource, well beyond a firm's industrial need, or modifying product
style too frequently, thereby addicting consumers to the habit of desir-
ability obsolescence, represent the kinds of barrier raising activities that
should be enjoinable.51
Additionally, the judicial approach to correcting competitive im-
balances may be greatly simplified by the barrier approach. Market
analyses and the long discovery they often entail could be avoided
since for some barriers only specific, highly visible practices would
be reviewed and enjoined. The government could simplify its task
in many instances by bringing more modest barrier-oriented actions
with the realization that it only needs to trim high barriers to restore
competitiveness.
The final argument for barrier analysis relates to the way courts
treat economic data. Records become voluminous, with paid economic
experts squaring off" and producing thousands of pages of documents
50 The "conduct" approach has come under recent, sensible attack. See, e.g., Mueller,
supra note 2, at 105-10; cf. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem:
Market Failure Considerations, 85 HARv. L. Rav. 1512, 1515 (1972). This author, generally
speaking, joins that bandwagon. However, when conduct clearly accounts for the competi-
tive imbalance and creates a warped structure, it is conduct that should first be chal-
lenged. As will be shown, in some sectors of the economy and for some entry barriers,
conduct is the root cause of any imbalance. A limited conduct approach also conforms to
the author's view that lighting a candle is an advancement over cursing the darkness.
For illumination, see notes 426-29 and accompanying text infra.
51 It is likely that firms do control some entry barriers which should be left alone.
For example, managerial excellence, certainly encouraged by all firms, would be difficult
and unfair to enjoin. The antitrust laws cannot realistically rely on a policy of suppression
of the human spirit and the personal will to succeed as an antidote to anticompetitive-
ness.
52 With respect to economic experts, vis-k-vis barrier experts, one hypothesis as to
the preferability of the latter is that expert witnesses, brought in to testify as to market
definition and share, are commonly practicing economists or professors who have become
expert in the subject industry by every means but experience. They are "employed" by
the party for which they testify and may be "experts" in numerous areas for different
"employers."
An expert in barriers, on the other hand, not required to evaluate the cosmic con-
cept of "market," may be more likely a working member of the industry itself. Such a
witness may be more capable, for example, of evaluating plant efficiencies and under-
standing the myriad forces at work in the price or style change decisions of any one
1973)
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and testimony.53 This swamp of economic data in the record does not
lead to sane or learned resolution of the issues. Courts are frequently
tempted by the sirens of market share, with its deceptively easy ex-
pression. By a simple table of percentages, courts may take the path of
least resistance and effectively ignore other economic criteria.5 4 Some
of the problems of market share analysis, discussed above,r5 suggest
that this unusual reliance may be risky.56 Barrier analysis, on the
other hand, though capable of generating a similar sea of detail, does
not depend upon inherently suspect and deceptive numerical analysis.
Barriers, if present, are relatively easy to identify, albeit difficult to
quantify.57 But the enjoining of particularly offensive entry-obstructing
conduct may hinge on its mere existence, not on the extent of its use.
Even if barrier theory becomes prominent in the antitrust regi-
men, courts might confuse the issues, use it incorrectly with other tools
of analysis, or still ignore it entirely. 8 The possibilities for nonuse or
misuse of barrier analysis, however, should not militate against the
attempt to elevate its importance in certain cases.59
company's management. It is also true that his testimony would be subjective and may
be paid for by the party for which he testifies. However, since his knowledge would be
limited to one area, perhaps a higher degree of accuracy and honesty could be expected
of him. Of course, in many instances the quality of expert testimony will not vary with
the subject matter or the witness's source of expertise.
53 Consider, for example, Litton Indus., Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,918 (ETC Feb.
22, 1972) rev'd, No. 8778 (FTC, Mar. 13, 1973), in which the record exceeded 10,000 pages.
54 Rathbone, supra note 17, at 50; see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963) (presumptive market share violation test). See generally Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1329 (1972)
(exploring the use, overuse, and misleading effects of numerical analysis in trials).
55 See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
56 Shepherd's study showed market share to be a very significant determinant of
high profitability. Shepherd 30. But its practical usefulness may not match its abstract
usefulness. Cf. KAYSEN & TURNER 101-02.
57 See P. Ascu, ECONOMIC THEORy AND THE ANTrrRusr DLEMMA 178 (1970). Neverthe-
less, an effort to quantify will be made below. See text accompanying notes 345-77 infra.
58 The court in Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961), showed
its general aversion to expanding the scope of economic issues when it rejected the sug-
gestion of the Attorney General's National Committee To Study the Antitrust Laws that
consideration be given to the possibilities for new entry in the industry of the defendant.
Id. at 827.
Dean Bok expresses the view that the widening use of economic theory yields
diminishing, even negative, returns and is of little predictive value. See Bok, Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 226, 349 (1960).
Professors Kaysen and Turner, however, cautiously conclude that important economic
issues are "susceptible to rational administrative or judicial determination." KAYsEN &
TURNER 240-41.
59 Professor Low has catalogued the general importance attached to entry barriers by
courts, government agencies, private litigants, and legal scholars. Low 515-19.
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II
THE ECONOMICS OF BARRIER ANALYSIS
A. Economies of Scale
"Economies of scale" describes the decline in unit production and
distribution costs occurring with the approach to optimal plant or
firm size by the producer.10 The larger the optimal plant size, the
larger the market share necessary to justify its existence,61 and the more
awesome the entry barrier must be to the new entrant.62 The estab-
lished firm, having reached economies of scale, can discourage the entry
of any new suboptimal producer by setting prices beneath his expected
average costs, including reasonable profit. 3 The greater the economies,
the less the established firm need drop its price from its profit-maxi-
mization position.
Entry may also be discouraged even if the entrant builds a
plant large enough to achieve scale economies. The added product on
the market may itself lead to price reductions6 4 and under-utilization
of capacity. 65 The prospective entrant would be discouraged, since he
then would need to capture a greater absolute market share than antici-
pated.
The significance of economies of scale in barrier analysis has been
a source of some disagreement among economists. One pioneer analyst,
Bain, concluded that economies of scale are the source of "at least
perceptible barriers to entry."60 In all but five of the twenty examples
from his 1956 study, the optimal plant size necessitated production
of less than five percent of the market. 7 Also, his study showed
that the cost of producing at less than maximum economies is generally
insubstantial."" In a more recent work, Shepherd has demonstrated
60 BAuRRERs 53.
61 CAVEs 24-25. This analysis assumes a constant level of demand.
02 However, if demand is price-elastic, a new entrant, by lowering his entry price
beneath that of existing competitors, can more quickly capture the market share needed
to achieve scale economies since such share requirement will be reduced by the market
expansion. Thus, this barrier can be dissipated, although the new entrant will sacrifice
initial revenue in so doing.
63 P. SYLOs-LABINI, OLIGOPOLY AND TECHNICAL PROGREss 57-60 (1962).
64 P. Ascii, supra note 57, at 162.
05 P. SYLOS-LABINI, supra note 63, at 43. Existing firms may not cut back production
partly because their economies encourage full capacity and partly in order to compound
the difficulties of the new entrant.
66 BAIN 280. In his 1968 review of his 1956 study, Bain concluded that average scale
economies would allow pricing 2% to 4% above minimal average costs. Id. at 281.
07 BAR mPUs 72-74.
68 Id. at 78-86. Bain's data is far from complete on this matter, but the findings he
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that scale economies which relate to overall firm size do not contribute
to higher profits.69 In fact, he found them negatively correlated. 0 This
suggests that diseconomies supervene to influence profitability,71 and
that such diseconomies develop at a sufficiently early level to have per-
vaded his sample. Therefore, scale economies must be reached at a
relatively low level of production. Notwithstanding the general weak-
ness of scale economies as an entry barrier, in industries which support
only a few efficient producers their importance may be substantial.72
B. Absolute Cost Advantages
The ability of an established firm, regardless of size, to produce
goods more cheaply per unit than a new entrant, creates cost ad-
vantages which, when transmitted to price, may deter new entry.73
A firm may further have the ability to block new entry simply by
possessing an element or process necessary to production which is
unavailable to a possible entrant at any cost.7 4
Generally, an established firm's lower production costs reflect
superior production techniques or the availability of the elements of
production at lower prices than are available to a new entrant. Spe-
cifically, such advantages may be related to the possession of patents or
trade secrets economizing the production process, or they may reflect
the greater availability of certain resources. 5 For example, both man-
agement expertise76 and research facilities77 may be resources which
the established firm possesses at lower cost or with more productivity
could muster do support this conclusion. Based on Bain's study Professor Caves concludes
that none of the really high barriers are attributable to scale economies. CAvEs 29.
69 Shepherd 35.
70 Id. Shepherd did not analyze scale economies per se, but rather the relation of
firm size to profitability, apparently under the assumption that the larger the firm, the
more likely it will have reached and remained at scale economies. Id.
71 See SCHERER 217-18. Scherer traces the market share decline of several historic
monopolists, due partly to ultimate diseconomies of production. Id.
72 Cf. KAYSEN & TURNER 78. Economies of scale may also extend to research, capital,
and promotional costs. The analysis here would apply to them as well. These barriers
will be treated in other respects in the pages that follow. See notes 82-125 and accompany-
ing text infra.
'3 BARuERs 144.
74 Id. at 145. By integrating vertically or utilizing product tie-ins, old firms may
control so much of a resource that a new competitor (at the original level) finds that the
cost of acquiring such resources in order to compete is prohibitive, while integrating or
producing the tied resource to meet the competition head-on may raise prohibitively his
entering capital requirements. Id. at 145-46. See also KAYSEN & TURNER 120-21, 157.
75 BARIUEps 144-45.
76 Id. at 148.
77 See Comanor, Market Structure, Product Differentiation, and Industrial Research,
81 q.j. ECON. 639, 652-56 (1967).
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than the new firm. Equally, the uniqueness of the work-product derived
from management expertise and research facilities may discourage entry
since it reduces the firm's operating costs.
An existing firm may also impede entry by holding patents on a
product or a production process.78 Without such patents, the new
entrant may find it costly or impossible to imitate the process.7 9
If the patent is vital, the holder can license it to the entrant, but even
then the neophyte is competitively disadvantaged. 0 The aggressive
competitor may build the barriers even higher by patenting every con-
ceivable process or by accumulating patents to shield expiring patents
or unpatented processes. The existing firm may also threaten or bring
spurious or inconsequential infringement suits, effectively chilling the
competitive use of different but related processes. The end result may
be no entry or costly licensing.8 '
Corporate research has been shown to be an effective device for
preventing entry.8 2 In a recent study, Professor William S. Comanor
observed that when research could only establish a low barrier, firms
were hesitant to invest great sums for fear of imitation. 3 With high
barriers, the research product could not be used to raise barriers any-
way; hence there was no need to spend excessively. However, in be-
tween these extremes, when the industry could accommodate a varying
expenditure for research and entry barriers were otherwise moderate,
Comanor found that research had been used to impede entry.8 4
The unavailability or high cost of capital may discourage new
entry or greatly increase the barriers to it. The largest and most estab-
lished firms have access to liquid resources as well as to longer-term
financing at preferential interest rates.8 5 The new entrant may be dis-
78 See ScHERER 230.
79 Of course, to the extent that patent law requires some detailing of the invention
on the public record, the value of a patent as an entry barrier is minimized.
80 If the patent reflects significant development and research costs, which the licensee
never has to face, the competitive disadvantage of the license to him is somewhat less. It is
further lessened by knowledge that the patent is temporary, lasting no longer than 17 years.
81 KAYSEN & TURNER 160-66. Akin to patent rights are other governmental grants of
exclusive rights, for example, offshore petroleum rights and licenses, and television broad-
cast licenses. See SCEsaR 125. Also, legislation putatively designed for social purposes may
actually bar entry. See, e.g., Jadlow, Competition and "Quality" in the Drug Industry:
The 1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments as Barriers to Entry, 5 ANTrrRusT L. & EcoN.
REV., Winter 1971, at 103, 122. See also J. GOULDEN, THE SuPERLAwYERS 32-37 (1972) (regard-
ing the act establishing the Civil Aeronautics Board). These governmentally-created
barriers may be considerably more difficult to overcome than the patent right.
82 Comanor, supra note 77, at 656-57.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 BARRIERS 146; KAYSEN & TURNER 116.
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advantaged both by his lack of reputation in the financial community
and by his need for larger sums (the cost of starting up). Capital simply
may be unavailable in the amounts needed"8 or its cost may be too
high to merit the risk. 7
It is generally thought, however, that absolute cost advantages do
not significantly bar entry; certainly they are less significant than econ-
omies of scale."" Patents can be skirted or licensed without frustrating
entry.8 9 Technological innovation, which may allow existing patent
avoidance, has been demonstrated to be uniquely within the realm of
the new entrant.90 Even though resources can be temporarily con-
trolled, discoveries of new productive materials frequently allow new
entry.91 Managerial skill and know-how may be barriers, but are con-
sidered slight and temporary;9 2 moreover, their regulation may be
particularly repugnant to deeper social policies.93
From his study, Bain was unable to conclude how or to what de-
gree capital requirements affected entry.94 Similarly, Professor George
J. Stigler was unable to conclude that the status of capital markets
showed anything about the likely success of a new or small entrant in
securing a loan.95 It is likely, however, that older, larger firms do
fare better on the financial market, and are less troubled by capital
requirements.96
86 In Bain's study, only 3 of the 20 industries could be financed "locally," while 7
were thought to require in excess of $50 million to get off the ground. BARiEsRS 156-59.
87 See generally id. at 146.
88 See id. at 155.
89 Some strategic patents, however, may cause insurmountable barriers. BAIN 282.
90 SCHEVR 280, 376-77. Scherer notes a number of products, including the dial tele-
phone and the electric typewriter, which evolved from new companies, unhampered by
the physical and psychological commitments of the old. Older companies, however, in the
face of upstart innovation, may fight back. Consider IBM's innovations in electronic com-
puter technology in response to the significant entry of Control Data Corporation. Id. at
377. Also, if entry barriers are otherwise very high, innovation is less likely to occur.
S. STuRMEY, Ten ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO 277 (1958).
91 See G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRIcE 255 (1966). Oil discoveries in the 1920's for ex-
ample, created unowned fresh resource supplies and the opportunity for their acquisition
by then new entrants.
92 BARsRxs 148-49, 155; BAIN 282.
93 See note 51 supra.
94 BAxtREns 165.
95 G. STiGLER, supra note 91, at 223-25.
96 BARaRm 146. This is not, pro tanto, a bar to entry, because new entrants in one
industry are frequently old firms in another. Given their existing strength in the financial
market, they should be at no great disadvantage compared to existing competitors in their
new market in receiving loans. Cf. Osborne, The Role of Entry in Oligopoly Theory, 72
J. POL. EcoN. 396, 399-400 (1964). But see Mansfield, Entry, Gibrat's Law, Innovation, and
the Growth of Firms, 52 Am. EcoN. REv. 1023 (1962). Professor Mansfield found new entry
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C. Product Differentiation
If a firm is able to induce buyers to purchase its product for rea-
sons unrelated to objective standards of quality and price, then it has
created a product differentiation advantage allowing it to price at a
level above its average costs, commensurate with the attractiveness of
the differentiation. 97 When differences exist which buyers appraise and
value objectively, no economically significant product differentiation
can arise.98 When differentiation exists, the barrier to the new entrant
is measured by the sum of (a) the difference between his projected
price charged and the profit-maximization price expected without dif-
ferentiation and (b) the difference between his promotional costs and
those promotional costs expected without differentiation. 99
Product differentiation is created by firm and product reputation,
proximity reliability, and plentitude of firm (or dealer) distribution
and service, product design and style, and promotional (sales and
advertising) expenditures. 100 Its strength as a viable barrier lies with the
large number of purchasers who, for subjective reasons or through ig-
norance, become wedded to a specific product.101
Product differentiation, not surprisingly, occurs with greatest fre-
quency in the consumer-goods sector.10 2 This is where the least in-
negatively correlated with the size of capital investment required. Id. at 1024-28. This
may suggest that capital markets may be less relevant than the increasing hesitation to
spend even available capital on an untested venture as it becomes more costly.
97 BARRiERs 116. See also BAMN 229-81. Product differentiation has also been charac-
terized in terms of cross-elasticities. A low cross-elasticity of demand among competing
products is characteristic of an industry with high product differentiation. Similarly, a
low cross-elasticity of supply suggests that competing products within an industry are
sufficiently nonduplicable so that buyer preferences cannot be readily changed, i.e., prod-
uct differentiation is effective. See Comanor & Wilson, Advertising, Market Structure and
Performance, 49 Rxv. EcoN. & STArS. 428, 424 (1967).
98 CAVES 20.
99 BARIRs 116. See also P. Asc, supra note 57, at 162. For example, if an oligopolist
sells its boomerang for $1, with promotional costs of 10€, and a new entrant, to attract
purchasers, would have to charge 900 with promotional costs of 20€, then the immediate
cost of entry is 20¢ per unit. It is the prospective entrant's calculation of his ability to
sustain that additional initial cost for a given duration which determines the likelihood
of his entry. But it must be rare when such figures are meaningfully calculable before
entry.
100 Comanor & Wilson, supra note 97, at 424. See also BAIN 459. For a more thorough
discussion of advertising, see notes 109-25 and accompanying text infra.
101 CAvEs 20-21.
102 BAmu Rs 128-25. In Bain's sample only the tractor and typewriter industries
showed high product differentiation in the producer-goods segment. Producers, generally
more sophisticated and dealing with more homogeneous products, do not differentiate the
way consumers do. Interestingly, tractors and typewriters can both be consumer products.
Id. at 128-24.
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
formed, least cost-motivated buyers customarily "do their shopping."
Consumers may consciously ignore pricing in purchasing decisions. The
motivations for conspicuous consumption and gift buying often lead
to a demand for higher, not lower prices, regardless of product quality.
Some goods are purchased so infrequently and -are so complex
that consumers lack the experience to evaluate product quality. House-
hold appliances and automobiles are two examples of products of
sufficiently complex construction and infrequent purchase such that
considerable seller promotion is essential. In purchasing such items,
consumers are left to rely on a vague sense of reputation and quality
promoted by the self-serving manufacturer (or his distributor).10 3 In-
deed, the inability of the consumer to evaluate quality objectively leads
him to fix on stylistic and design differences, 104 giving rise to superficial
quality appraisal. The refrigerator-freezer which dispenses ice cubes
through the door will be credited with higher quality than the more
durable competitive model, sans gimmick. The car with the sleekest
lines will attract the attention of the average buyer over the car with
the best engineering. Consumers are more likely, however, to evaluate
according to quality and price when purchasing more frequently
needed products such as food and clothing.105
Sellers can increase product differentiation and raise entry barriers
by spending more money on promotion, by making more design and
style variations without quality improvements, by making more fre-
quent product changes, by proliferating more exclusive dealerships,
and by raising the apparent level of customer service.106 It is widely
agreed that this ability to increase differentiation is frequently exer-
cised and is a major deterrent to entry.'07 What is perhaps more telling
about its force is that the highest barriers are commonly correlated
with substantial product differentiation. In consumer-goods industries
103 BAIN 282, 459.
104 Id. at 226.
105 Id. at 459. Of course, food and, especially, clothing may be purchased for reasons
unrelated to utility. Promotion and design are sometimes more important than quality in
creating consumer demand even for these commodities.
106 Id. at 233; cf. W. SsmErnm, MARKar PowER AND ECONOMIC WELrARE 236 (1970).
Shepherd details how annual style changes in the automobile industry have effectively
foreclosed new entry there. See also 1 S. WsrrNEy, supra note 41, at 478.
The presence of exclusive dealerships also boosts the cost of entry to potential com-
petitors who are required to enter the market fully integrated for lack of a retail outlet.
Such dealerships further broaden advertising avenues by standing with night lighting and
linoleum as ubiquitous community reminders of the distant manufacturer. See generally
Mueller, supra note 37, at 30-31, 34.
107 Caves states flatly, "[P]roduct differentiation plays the leading role [in explaining
the] really high barriers." CAVFS 28. See also BAIN 281.
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particularly, the only true barrier to entry frequently is product dif-
ferentiation.108
D. Advertising
Advertising, as a barrier to entry, combines elements of the other
barriers discussed. 109 The use of advertising may involve significant
economies of scale. The older, larger firms can send more messages and
reach more people per dollar and per unit than can the newer and
smaller firms. 10 Quantity discounts for large-scale advertising,"1 the
spreading of services of advertising agencies among greater advertising
output, and the need to create only once a widely-recognized image and
reputation that may be re-used over time (and from product to product
with minimal "upkeep" cost), all create such economies." 2
The established advertiser also has cost advantages over the new-
comer. The newcomer may have to borrow money to advertise, in-
creasing his capital requirements. As difficult as start-up funds may be
to acquire anyway, it may be even more difficult to finance an initial
advertising campaign upon which the creditor cannot take a security
interest."3
Further, the advertising costs incurred in getting consumers to
switch from established products to those of the new entrant may be
higher at all levels of production for the new entrant than for the
existing firm."- As the new entrant starts up, it will incur high adver-
tising costs just to break the buying habits and loyalties of its com-
petitors' customers. As production increases and more buyers are
sought, even more intensive advertising will be necessary. At this stage,
the more lethargic or faithful buyers, hesitant to break old ties, must
be bombarded with the new entrant's message in order to be persuaded
to switch.115
108 CAvEs 27-28. Caves correlates product differentiation directly to high concentration
in some of those industries. CA vEs 33-35. It is possible for a new entrant, already estab-
lished in another industry, to surmount the entry barrier by utilizing its own expertise
and by transferring its reputation to create differentiation for its new product. See gen-
erally BARuIRS 142; SCHERER 280; Osborne, supra note 99, at 399-400.
109 It also receives special treatment because it has generated considerable interest
and debate recently. See, e.g., Brozen, No Scarlet Letters, 52 BARRON'S, Feb. 28, 1972, at 7.
110 Turner 95; cf. L. WEiss, ECONOMICs AND AMERICAN INDus-rY 342 (1961) (noting
that in the 1950's Studebaker and American Motors spent more than twice as much per
car on advertising than did General Motors and Ford).
ll Turner 95.
112 Comanor & Wilson, supra note 97, at 425-26; cf. BARRIERS 65; Bok, supra note 58,
at 276. Contra, Telser, Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL. ECON. 537, 556-58 (1964).
113 Comanor & Wilson, supra note 97, at 426.
114 Of course the existing firm may have had such expenses in the past.
115 Id. at 425. The classic "I'd rather fight than switch" cigarette commercial signifies
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Advertising costs are thought most significant in the creation of
product differentiation.11 6 Bain has captured the flavor of advertising
in relation to product differentiation:
[T]he bulk of advertising is ... primarily "persuasive" [not "in-
formational"]. It is aimed at creating product preferences through
generally phrased praises of the attributes of various outputs ...
or simply through the dinning into the potential buyer's mind an
awareness of the product through endless repetition. Thus an im-
portant category of product differentiation is built primarily on a
nonrational or emotional basis, through the efforts of the "ad-
man."17
Professor Turner noted the ease with which advertising can become
noninformational, creating "preferences going beyond the relative
superiority of the product, resistant to anything but major counter-
vailing promotional campaigns."" 8 In his study, Bain also determined
that advertising was used most extensively for products bereft of other
means of differentiation, such as cigarettes, soap, and liquor." 9
Other commentators disagree on the extent to which advertising is
an entry barrier. Professors Comanor and Wilson concluded from their
study that advertising can be a major barrier to entry, particularly in
consumer-goods industries. 20 Professor Telser, in an earlier article,
came to an opposite conclusion; 121 but as Comanor and Wilson point
out, Telser's assumption that the degree of concentration is correlative
to the strength of competition is inaccurate. It loses sight of other
significant elements of market structure and power which can account
for noncompetitiveness. 122 Advertising is as much a barrier as product
differentiation itself, already characterized as significant.'2 Brozen's
theory, which views advertising as a "means of entry,"' 24 is also not
compelling, despite the large following which the theory commands. 25
the consumer loyalty an established firm and its product enjoy. The older firm's cost
advantage is not absolute, however, since the new firm will encounter reduced advertising
costs when the desired number of buyers have switched over.
116 Id. at 423.
117 BMA 227.
118 Turner 94.
119 BARRS 125.
120 Comanor & Wilson, supra note 97, at 425, 437.
121 Telser, supra note 112, at 556-58.
122 Comanor & Wilson, supra note 97, at 424.
123 It has been theorized that advertising is a result, not a cause, of product differen-
tiation and, therefore, does not itself raise a barrier. BAreunRs 142-43. Indeed, consumers
may thrive on the proliferation of advertising as an end unto itself. See generally Turner
94.
124 Brozen, supra note 109, at 10.
125 Id. Brozen totally ignores the matter of persuasive, as opposed to informational,
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E. Firm Size
There exists the economically elusive notion that corporate bigness
itself constitutes a barrier to entry. The very size of an existing firm or
firms is said to discourage new entry. Insofar as it allows the achieve-
ment of scale economies, cost advantages, and product differentiation,
corporate bigness is clearly a barrier. 26 However, bigness has been
claimed to be an independent deterrent as well. 27 Large size gives
a firm the leverage to price in a manner that discourages entry. s8 Its
very existence may create a psychological shadow over an industry into
which otherwise likely entrants will fear to tread. 29 In addition, a
firm's size may have sufficient impact upon the financial markets to
discourage them from serving the new entrant.130 There is also some
congressional support for the notion that bigness is a barrier to entry.
During hearings on section 7 of the Clayton Act, Representative Celler
observed that "[g]reat masses of economic power and monopoly stunt
the growth of individual enterprise and kills [sic] individual ambition
and individual dignity."'13
Yet in Shepherd's recent study, firm size correlated negatively with
profits. 3 2 He attributed this to the ineffeciencies of large scale which
advertising with its coercive effects. See generally V. PACKARD, TiE HIDEN PERSUADERS
(1957). Moreover, he does not discuss excessive advertising, the true barrier. His example
of the eye glass market compares one state where advertising was allowed with another
state where it was not, showing that in the former state eye glasses were cheaper. Brozen,
supra note 109, at 10. However, the example does not measure the differences between
reasonable and excessive advertising. He further argues that advertising will only sell the
product the first time, after which the quality of the product itself will determine its
continued use. Id. This analysis completely ignores the quantity of use to which an
accepted product is put, as well as how advertising may persuade the consumer to buy
the product more often. Even the products of monopolists have measurable cross-elastici-
ties with other products, and they must promote continued use lest the public alter its
habits to avoid the product entirely (e.g., a cola to milk conversion).
Insofar as advertising weds a consumer to use, or overuse, of a product, it still is a
barrier to entry to would-be competitors. See Turner 94. Advertising is a "means" of
entry because it may be the only way for some firms to enter. But in advertising-intensive
industries the stakes are high. Thus, it is a usable means of entry for only a few, but a
barrier for the rest.
126 KAYSEN & TuRNER 116. See also Bok, supra note 58, at 276.
127 See, e.g., Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in BuSINESS CON-
CENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331, 334-35 (1955).
128 Bok, supra note 58, at 348. Turner, however, concluded that such a pricing practice
is not a necessary consequence of large size. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and § 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1313, 140 (1965).
129 Mueller, supra note 2, at 127; cf. Bok, supra note 58, at 275.
130 Edwards, supra note 127, at 335-36.
131 Hearings, supra note 14, ser. 14, pt. 13, at 15 (statement of Representative Celler).
132 Shepherd 35.
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frequently beset larger companies. 133 His finding suggests that bigness
alone does not breed market power and perhaps, by extension, that
bigness alone does not result in power to keep entrants out. The Federal
Trade Commission's recent report on conglomerate merger perfor-
mance supports this conclusion. 134 At least for the nine giant corpora-
tions evaluated, anticompetitive activity by virtue of size was not
evidenced. 135 The Commission also found no support for the theory
that predatory pricing, economies of scale, or advertising intensity
increased absolutely after the acquisitions.83
These studies should make one hesitate to suggest that bigness per
se is a significant barrier to entry. Some courts, however, have not
been so hesitant as will be illustrated below.137
F. Pricing
Implicitly underlying the foregoing analysis are the roles which
pricing decisions can play in allowing firms both to profit by entry
barriers and to take advantage of such barriers to keep out new firms.
It is usually thought that any entry barrier allows the firms in an
industry to set higher prices and take higher profits than would be
possible absent such barrier. However, prices may also be set lower
than short-run profit-maximization principles would dictate in order
138 Id. In a study of six huge conglomerates, the Subcommittee on Antitrust of the
House Judiciary Committee found the post-acquisition profits of the acquired companies
to be generally and substantially diminshed from their pre-acquisition status. STAFF OF
THE SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUsr OF THE HouSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92D CONG., Isr SESS.,
INVESTIGATION OF CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS 407-11 (1971). See also Mueller, supra note
2, at 99 (larger firms may be inferior to smaller firms in research and development).
184 FTC, REPORT ON CONGLOMERATE MERGER PERFORMANcE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
NINE CORPORATIONS (1972).
135 Id. at 199.
136 Id. at 66-68, 191, 195-96, 199. The report may provide only weak support for the
general thrust of this section. First, it was based on surveys conducted only two or three
years after the merger boom that brought these giant corporations into prominence. Id. at
12. Any elevation of barriers in specific industries might have required more time for the
principal to filter its benefits down to the newly acquired companies. Second, not all big
companies face the inherent weaknesses of conglomerates. Companies more unified in
operation and more directed to one integral set of markets might better wield whatever
powers their size allows on their competitors in any one such market. See notes 231-50 and
accompanying text infra.
137 Firm size probably influences the design of many of the orders which grow out
of antitrust proceedings. A big company, the benefactor of all the previously discussed
means of barring competition, can be divided more efficiently than it could be enjoined
from various business practices which are incident to its size. Compliance with ongoing
orders is easily circumvented because compliance matters have a relatively low priority in
the federal antitrust enforcement budget. Divestment, therefore, frequently provides a more
expedient course, though perhaps one less economically defensible.
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to discourage the advent of new competition.138 Generally, entry into
an industry is deterred when more profitable investment could be made
elsewhere. Theoretically, by pricing to reduce profits, would-be entrants
will be thrown off the track and invest in some other industry.139
In theory, only intermediate barriers could induce special pricing
to prevent new entry.140 Industries with impregnable barriers, such
as mainstream protective patents, can price monopolistically without
attracting new entry.'4 1 Industries with low barriers will be driven
down to competitive pricing because the barriers cannot retard the
proliferation of new competitors. Pricing above competitive levels with
inexpensive or costless entry would alert would-be entrants to the
above-normal profits which the industry apparently offers, and conse-
quent entry would force down prices accordingly.142
An industry may take advantage of its moderate entry barriers by
practicing limit pricing. Limit pricing is simply setting product prices
at a level that barely discourages outsiders from entering. 4 3 The
gap between the unit cost and the limit price is just less than the en-
tering cost, including reasonable profit, attributable to the product.144
Therefore, the potential entrant is deterred by his inability to secure a
normal return upon entry, while the existing firm still profits (although
it may earn less). 145 Professor Frederic M. Scherer suggests that limit
pricing be linked with "irrational" pricing to describe the fall panoply
of entry-eliminating price mechanisms. 48 Irrational pricing should be
threatened by the existing firm when large-scale efficient entry appears
imminent. Such entry would be of sufficiently low cost so as not to be
deterred by any rational industry limit price.147 The irrational price,
138 Osborne, supra note 96, at 396.
139 One commentator states that prospective entrants are swayed more by present
profits than by potential profits. G. STiGLm, supra note 91, at 227. Thus, a manufacturer's
ability to hold back profits can deter entry effectively by misleading possible entrants.
140 BAIN 275.
141 This statement assumes the absence of intra-industry competition.
142 BARRIERS 34-41.
143 Mueller characterizes this as the "entry-forestalling" price. See Mueller, supra
note 2, at 125.
144 For example, if a likely entrant calculates that his costs (with reasonable return)
will be $1.00 per unit, the existing firm can prevent his entry by pricing its product at
$.99, a price which the likely entrant must now meet if he chooses to enter. The knowl-
edge that the venture will yield a smaller return than expected will theoretically divert
the frustrated nonentrant into a more profitable alternative investment.
145 See generally ScHERER 219-24. Scherer expands on the foregoing analysis in a
manner well beyond the scope of this paper.
146 Id. at 229.
147 An irrational price policy would allow firms to set a higher limit price, discourag-
ing only the smallest, least efficient firms from entering. Id.
1973]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
therefore, could be even below manufacturers' average costs. If effectu-
ated, it leads to the kind of price war that founders the newly-launched
entrant before it even goes to sea.148 It is hoped that the threat of such
pricing will deter entry before the actual pricing is employed.
The difficulties with limit pricing, which would seem to confine its
relevance to theory, largely center on the legal risks and uncertainties
involved in its use. First, no one firm in an industry could limit price
to bar entry. The entire industry would be required to adopt such
a policy for meaningful obstruction.149 In an oligopolistic industry,
such informal, unconscious price coordination may be possible within
the law.150 But, the likelihood of illegal collusion seems manifest in oli-
gopolies and even greater in less concentrated industries.151 A simple
drop in price by an industry leader would have to be followed by his
competitors, whatever the reason for the drop. But that leader's
charging a lower price than the market would otherwise bear, just
to stave off an unseen enemy, then raising it again, would be unwise
in the absence of agreement. A series of such acts, irrational if done
singly, but rational if done by all, may demonstrate collusion and vio-
late the Sherman Act.152
The uncertainties arise because the industry may have difficulties
in determining the cost of entry. One firm on the edge of the market
may be able to accomplish entry more cheaply than another, or at
least think it can. To bar entry completely, the industry must deter-
mine the cost of entry of the firm most likely to enter. Gathering such
data is difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, the limit price may be
little more than conjecture and only haphazardly effective. 5 3 More-
over, even if discovered and reasonably set, the limit price would not
discourage entry by the most irrational firms, nor would it affect the
actions of firms able to perceive and weather the mechanism in use.
Such firms may find it advantageous to attempt to overcome initial
148 Id. at 228-29. Scherer notes that in periods of expanding demand, the threat of
irrational pricing cannot deter otherwise interested large-scale entrants. Id. at 229.
149 BARRIERS 27.
15D Section 1 of the Sherman Act would prevent outright price fixing. See United
States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
151 Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers and Criteria for Defining Potential En-
trants, 15 Awrrrusr BuLL. 489, 493 (1970).
152 The Supreme Court has held that prices cannot be fixed either minimally or
maximally. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
Seagrams & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
153 Berger & Peterson, supra note 151, at 493; cf. Hines, Effectiveness of Entry by
Already Established Firms, 71 Q.J. EcoN. 132, 149 (1957). '
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barriers in order to realize later increased profits if the limit price is
abandoned, or to reap the benefits of being in a perpetually insulated
industry if the limit price is maintained.
Despite the risks of limit pricing, it is used. One pricing study
showed that General Foods held down prices because higher prices
would have accelerated the development of future competition. 54 In
a recent work, Scherer cites the "big three" cigarette makers of the
early 1930's who cut back prices to stem the penetration of cheap
cigarette manufacturers into the market. 5 5 He also notes that the
continued dominance of General Motors and Alcoa is due partly to
their refusal to take high short-run profits. 156 His conclusion is that
price restraint has more to do with minimizing entry than do other
economic entry barriers. 157 The inherent uncertainties in using this
device, however, are more likely to reduce its significance as a barrier.
Indeed, if limit pricing leads to lower prices than expected, it results in
an immediate benefit to consumers. The offsetting long-range cost to
consumers is the deterrence of new entries, which limit pricing may,
in any event, fail to accomplish. 158
154 A. KAPLAN, J. DIRLAM & R. LANZILLOMT, PRICING IN BIG BUSINESS 216 (1958).
155 ScIEmRa 21.
156 Id. This recent announcement in a trade publication demonstrates the contem-
porary use of limit pricing in the pharmaceuticals industry:
In anticipation of patent expiration, SK & F made price reductions on Thora-
zine obviously based on the marketing principle that cutting the dollar margin
will discourage efforts by other pharmaceutical mfrs. [sic] to establish a competing
brand-name product by shrinking the amount of money available for a strong,
new promotional effort.
F.D.C. REPORTs, March 19, 1973, at 6. Scherer could not have stated a better classic defini-
tion of limit pricing than that which was produced by actual practice here.
157 ScHIaaR 232.
158 Osborne, supra note 96, at 402. Mueller has stated:
rIhe ... probable result [of limit pricing] is that the established firms will pick a
conservative figure well below the danger zone, thus turning this element of un-
certainty in estimating barrier heights to the further advantage of the consuming
public. The net result.., is that the established firms in even the most concen-
trated sectors may ... behave as though they were ... much more competitively
structured ....
Mueller, supra note 2, at 125. Of course, an industry may distract would-be entrants as
much by raising costs as by reducing price. Recognition of this approach to deterrence
is not new. In 1776, Adam Smith wrote:
When by an increase in the effectual demand, the market price of some
particular commodity happens to rise a good deal above the natural price, those
who employ their stocks in supplying that market are generally careful to conceal
this change. If it was commonly known, their great profit would tempt so many
new rivals to employ their stocks in the same way, that, the effectual demand
being fully supplied, the market price would soon be reduced to the natural
price, and perhaps for some time even below it.
A. SMrr, THE WEALTH oF NATIONs 60 (Modern Library ed. 1937).
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III
BARRIER THEORY IN LAW
A. Antitrust Litigation
Antitrust cases are frequently resolved on their facts with little
consideration given to precedent or to an ordered handling of eco-
nomic data.5 9 The history of judicial and administrative construction
of entry barriers fits easily into this nonpattern. Thus, the criteria so
neatly laid out by economists have been rarely followed.160
Generally, the courts have not placed great reliance on the actual
incidence of entry prior to the suit. For example, in American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,161 battle lines were drawn
around the issue of previous entry into the sugar industry. The Second
Circuit gave little solace to the defendant even though it found that
eight firms had entered in the thirty years preceding the suit. 62 Rather,
the court emphasized that the diligence demonstrated by defense coun-
sel in producing the eight entrants was consistent with the conclusion
that barriers were high and the merger should be prohibited.6 3 The
court relied primarily on other grounds in reaching its decision, 64
but its cavalier treatment of the entry issue, never considering the rami-
fications of such entry, is notable.
Record of entry was used to undermine the Justice Department's
case in United States v. National Steel Corp.6 5 The court noted that
between 1957 and 1959, the number of companies doing business in
the prefabricated building industry had more than doubled--going
159 Cf. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 582 (1967) (Harlan, J., con-
curring). In a recent work, Armentano levelled a broadside attack on antitrust law
in general. His view is that the precedents are chaotic only because they are, so to
speak, marching to the beat of an indifferent drum, i.e., to a general economic theory
underlying present antitrust law enforcement which is empirically unsuccessful at im-
proving competition. See D. ARMENTANO, THE MYTHS Or ANTITRusr 273-74 (1972).
160 Low found no absolute correlation between the measured height of entry barriers
(from existing studies) and the results of cases involving those measured industries. See
Low 524.
161 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958). In this case, a cane sugar company attempted to
acquire stock in plaintiff beet sugar processor, allegedly with an eye toward gaining actual
control of the firm.
162 Id. at 530.
163 Id. at 530-31.
164 The court accepted the lower court's finding based upon price rigidity, an
unnatural (legislatively induced) incentive toward acquisition by existing competitors, and
the general "competitive situation of the industry." Id. at 527-28.
165 251 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Tex. 1965). The action was brought under § 7 of the
Clayton Act.
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from 70 to 144.166 This factor accounted for the defendant's victory
as much as any in that case, elevating the entry issue to a rare high
place in court considerations.
More often, the absence of entry is noted and the federal court
or Federal Trade Commission simply concludes that entry barriers
must, therefore, be too high.167 Courts rarely look into the reasons
underlying such nonentry168 In fact, one commentator has stated that
not a single case using the history of entry "test has led to a clear
result."169
The courts and the Commission do on occasion look into the
conditions that account for high barriers. Economies of scale, however,
have rarely been considered, as such, in determining whether barriers
were set too high for outsiders. In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,170
the Supreme Court decided that Procter 8c Gamble's ability to spread
its large advertising outlay over its whole range of products (reducing
the per unit cost), as well as its ability to get quantity discounts, created
entry-barring economies undesirable to impose on the liquid bleach
industry.171 The Court further said that an otherwise illegal merger
could not be justified by the greater economies possibly evolving out
of it.172 Even this handling of economies was tied to advertising, a
fairly simple activity to measure.
A more traditional treatment of scale economies was seen in
Brillo Manufacturing Co.173 There, the Commission noted that the
high cost of the necessary steel wool spinning machine made new
entrants inefficient, since they could not reach the required scale of
production to exploit the machine fully. The small size of the steel
wool industry made the economies factor all the more acute, since only
a small portion of the market could be captured after Brillo and
166 Id. at 698.
167 See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. FTC, 57 F.T.C. 1415, 1438 (1960), rev'd on other
grounds, 301 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1962), adhered to on remand, [19 6 3 -19 65 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 16,706 (FTC 1963).
168 See Low 525-26. A recent Commission case did use the paucity of recent entry
(only 1 in the past 10 years) as a starting point in considering other entry barriers. See
Papercraft Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,725, at 21,765 (FTC 1971), aff'd in part, modified
in part, Civil No. 71-1681 (7th Cir., Jan. 25, 1973). The lone entrant, a subsidiary of a large
corporation, tacitly demonstrated the finding that considerable cost advantages existed
as a barrier in the subject industry. Id. at 21,770-71.
169 Low 529.
170 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
171 Id. at 573. It is far from settled that such economies did exist. See generally
Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 11 J.L. & ECON. 321 (1968).
172 386 U.S. at 580.
173 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 16,543 (FTC 1963).
174 Id. at 21,467, 21,471.
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S.O.S. took their shares. 175 That such a small industry generated unique
economies problems substantiates the notion that scale problems do
not normally beset larger industries (or firms with large market
shares in smaller industries). 176
A recent Federal Trade Commission decision, however, appears to
represent an exception to this general view. In Kennecott Copper
Corp.,177 the respondent merged with the leading coal producer, Pea-
body, in a large and increasingly concentrated industry. The Com-
mission implied, apart from concentration, that rising technological
efficiencies, transportation economies, and customer requirements all
made small mines incapable of competing.178 Had Kennecott entered
the coal market in a manner not involving acquisition of the industry
leader, it presumably would have had the resources to generate a plant
of sufficient size to benefit from scale economies, making its loss as
an independent potential entrant particularly costly." 9
What is troubling about the Commission's treatment of scale
economies in Kennecott is that the reader is left the task of ascertaining
how economies are relevant to the decision. The Commission merely
noted that barriers were already high and were increasing. 80 If, how-
ever, the acquisition would have promoted more rapid technical de-
velopment with concomitant higher scale economies, then it is not
175 Id. at 21,471.
176 See note 72 and accompanying text supra. In Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C.
944 (1962), the Commission ordered Foremost to divest itself of 10 previous dairy ac-
quisitions, in part because new technology created great economies of scale. Recognizing
that small dairies could no longer establish themselves and compete, the Commission
moved to check the elimination of existing local dairies which had the ability to expand
into other markets and to take advantage of the full economies of the industry, in direct
competition with Foremost. Id. at 1088-89. Despite the large size of some dairy companies
and the industry as a whole, the purifying, bottling, and distributing processes arc inher-
ently local, and there is competition on that level as well. Therefore, at least in terms
of the functional geographic markets involved, the dairy industry might be viewed as
a small industry to comport with the above opinion.
177 3 TRADE REG. lE. 19,619 (FTC 1971).
178 Id. at 21,667. The onset of more productive and advanced equipment, requiring
larger mines to be fully exploited, raised production scale economies. Transportation
scale economies were achieved by using longer, fuller trains. The increased energy
needs of electric utilities could only be accommodated by huge coal shipments. Id.
Although it is technically inaccurate to characterize a high customer requirement as
an economy of scale, nevertheless, this fact meant that only large producers could serve
a substantial share of the market.
179 Kennecott had the resources to expand a smaller company, allowing such
company sales of $100 million to $200 million per year-probably above the level of fully
efficient production and distribution. Id. at 21,670.
18D Id. at 21,667.
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obvious that the merger would have been undesirable. It is a fairer as-
sumption that the Commission intended the brief economies discussion
to underscore the value of Kennecott as a potential entrant. Barrier
theory can be integrated with other analytical theories and used to
resolve antitrust cases more clearly than the Kennecott decision would
suggest.
The cases often reflect a more careful consideration of the absolute
cost advantages that create entry barriers. In both Hartford-Empire
Co. v. United States's' and United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., 182 patents were accumulated in order to blanket production pro-
cesses and discourage future entry. In Hartford-Empire, several defen-
dant glass-makers conspired to prevent the licensing of their combined
patents to any manufacturer outside their group. 83 This was found to
suppress future competition in the glass making industry. 4 Although
the court did not label this scheme as a cost-advantage barrier, the clear
purpose of the conspiracy was to maximize the leverage of the con-
spirators' cost advantages in blocking future entry.
In United Shoe, the defendant carried on a policy of accumulating
patents and inventions, some of which were then unnecessary to its
production, in order to "la[y] the ghost of some potential competi-
tion."185 Judge Wyzanski observed that patent licensing would have
been less restrictive and concluded that the only added benefit of
purchasing patents was in blocking future competition.18 6 United Shoe
is one of the few cases that has precisely considered the various barrier
problems involved. The thoroughness of the opinion may be attribut-
able to the full-time economist who served under the judge during the
period of the litigation.187
In United Shoe, Judge Wyzanski rejected the government's allega-
tion that United conducted its research in a way which discouraged
entry. 18 In contrast, the FTC, in Union Carbide Corp.,18 9 noted that
181 323 U.S. 886 (1945).
182 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
183 323 U.S. at 386.
184 Id. at 400, 407.
185 110 F. Supp. at 312.
186 Id. at 333.
187 Noted economist, Professor Carl Kaysen, was appointed by Judge Wyzanski to
compile and analyze the economic data relating to the case. For Kaysen's account of that
experience see C. KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION; AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSiS OF AN ANrrrRusr CAsE (1956).
188 110 F. Supp. at 332.
189 59 F.T.C. 614 (1961).
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the nature of the polyethylene resin manufacturing industry neces-
sitated substantial research outlays in order to penetrate the market
and continued high outlays in order to succeed.10
Courts have also recognized that entry-limiting quotas and regu-
lations may create barriers giving insiders clear advantages over out-
siders. In American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,191
after looking at past entry, the court remarked that the sugar quota
imposed by the National Sugar Act made the sugar industry "peculiarly
inhospitable to incursions from outside entrepreneurs."' 192 In United
States v. Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co., 193 the Supreme
Court seemed to admit that the barriers to entry in New Jersey banking
were low.194 The Court nevertheless concluded that this factor did not
offset other likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger, since
New Jersey law impaired competitive banking, and no application had
been made for entry through the proper channels. 95 The clog on the
freedom of entry created by the state, even if just a formality, was
thought, pro tanto, to raise the barrier.196 Court handling of the entry
issue in Phillipsburg highlights the cursory and inadequate treatment
frequently afforded barrier issues in order for the Court to reach a
conclusion not inconsistent with other more trusted, but not necessarily
more reliable, proof.197
Cases which note high capital requirements as a barrier to entry
are more frequent. Perhaps the courts' weakness for numbers accounts
for this reliance. In Union Carbide, the FTC began its explication of
the entry difficulties by noting that it took a minimum expenditure of
$9 million to build an efficient plant. 98 The FTC treated the barrier
issues as pre-eminent in that case.199 In another FTC case, United
States Steel Corp. v. FTC,2°0 the Sixth Circuit endorsed the Com-
mission's findings that the most recent entrant invested $64 million
to gain access to the cement market and that a minimum $3 million
to $5 million was needed to start up.201
190 Id. at 652.
191 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
192 Id. at 530.
193 399 U.S. 350 (1970).
194 Id. at 368.
'95 Id. at 368-69.
196 Id. at 369. The Court reached this conclusion by gently skirting a lower court
decision, cited therein, which described how easily the barrier could be overcome.
197 Cf. Low 524.
198 59 F.T.C. at 652.
199 Id.
200 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970).
201 Id. at 604-05.
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In The Stanley Works,21 2 the respondent calculated that it would
require a $600,000 investment to expand into the subject market.20 3
The Commission implied that this was a meaningful entry barrier.20
But the figure, if convincing, is so only because of its "shock" value
since no analytical effort is made to justify it as a barrier.205 Indeed, one
is inclined to view the requirement not as a barrier at all since the alter-
native entry route chosen, by merger, cost respondent some $32 mil-
lion1206
Only one case can be found in which low capital requirements or
the absence of cost advantages were mentioned as evidence of low entry
barriers. 207 Clearly, these facets of barrier theory have been used almost
exclusively to buttress proof of violation.
The barrier of product differentiation was fulsomely treated in
A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. FTC, 208 where the court concluded that in-
surmountable barriers would be created by the projected market power
of a Spalding-Rawlings merger.20 9 The ways in which Spalding effec-
tively differentiated its baseball products from its competitors' products
were detailed. Sales to the major leagues, providing the basis for exten-
sive advertising promotions, the endorsements of star performers, and
the establishment of trade-name identification all were intended to wed
the consumer to the product.210 The court did not discuss any of the
ways in which Spalding created real or apparent differences in the prod-
uct, but the impact of Spalding's activities created the same effect in
the minds of buyers as could physical product differentiation.
In The Stanley Works,211 the Commission used the product differen-
tiation advantage of an acquired company's product as one reason to
void the merger between the company and Stanley.21 2 The product,
cabinet hardware, purchased primarily by builders, would seem difficult
to differentiate artifically.213 Yet, industry members apparently did so
202 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,646 (FTC 1971).
203 Id. at 21,698.
204 Id.
205 Thus the opinion does not include a discussion of the unavailability of capital
or the inability of Stanley or other potential competitors to incur the specific expenses.
206 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 21,690.
207 Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,121 (FTC Sept. 28, 1972). See note
305 and accompanying text infra.
208 301 F;2d 585 (3d Cir. 1962).
209 Id. at 620.
210 Id. at 618-20, 626.
211 3 TRADE REG. RPa. 19,646 (FTC 1971).
212 Id. at 21,698-99.
213 Of course, the irrationality of consumers, which provides the opportunity for
differentiation, could filter down to the wholesaler level which must cater to these whims.
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by achieving frequent style turnovers and wide style variety.21 4 By also
providing regular delivery of their products Stanley no doubt further
habituated customers to its product for reasons unrelated to price.215
Stanley is the only case which utilized the presence of product differen-
tiation (excluding promotions) to prove antitrust violations, albeit in
conjunction with several other barriers. One wonders whether the exces-
sive practice of differentiation alone might not be presently unlawful,
notwithstanding that economic analysis indicates it should be.216
The courts have been less reluctant to consider advertising activi-
ties which create product differentiation or other impenetrable barriers.
In Spalding, the court noted the "substantial" advertising expenditures
both merger participants made in order to build up consumer product
acceptance.217 These expenditures, which other industry leaders also
made, were thought to "loom large" in contributing to the stifling of
entry into the industry.218 Similar sentiments were expressed by the
Commission in The Stanley Works.219 Despite the lack of direct con-
sumer appeal of the product, substantial amounts of advertising were
placed in trade publications, thus contributing to a significant product
differentiation barrier220
However, the facile characterization of advertising by the Com-
mission raises two questions. First, Stanley spent between $50,000 and
$60,000 to advertise and promote the introduction of a new product.221
Another $100,000 would have been required to promote the products
Stanley would have independently introduced had the merger never
occurred. 222 While these may appear to be substantial sums, they would
214 3 TRADE REac. RE'. at 21,699. The Commission concluded that a "staff of designers"
would be required to keep up with competitors' style changes. Id.
215 Id. The Commission noted, but rejected as a significant barrier, the need to
obtain "adequate channels of distribution." Id.
216 See notes 107-08 and accompanying text supra. But see Amplex of Md., Inc. v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1036 (1968).
There, Amplex sought withdrawal of its boat motor franchise because Outboard also
carried the line of a competitor. Product differentiation was demonstrated by the price
disparity between Outboard's trade-name products and the identical product made under
an unadvertised name for a major chain purchaser. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at
11-12, Amplex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 389 U.S. 1086 (1968). The appeal
was dismissed because § 3 of the Clayton Act, requiring an executed lease, sale, or contract
containing the restrictive condition, was not met. 880 F.2d at 116. The court of appeals
did not even mention the flourishing product differentiation of Outboard in reaching its
decision.
217 801 F.2d at 619.
218 Id. at 620.
219 3 TRADE PE. REP. 19,646 (FTC 1971).
220 Id. at 21,698.
221 Id.
222 Id.
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only have been one-time expenditures. Thus, although such sums
would have been devoted to promotion, they more aptly are viewed
as part of the costs, that is, capital requirements, of entry. In this light,
it is doubtful whether the barrier was as substantial as claimed.223
Second, the annual expenditure of some $70,000 in "hardware
promotions" was itself regarded as contributing to high entry bar-
riers.224 However, Stanley is a multimillion dollar corporation, whose
advertising budget is likely a small percentage of its total sales225 and,
therefore, a reasonable expense, not a barrier. Further, blind categoriza-
tion of such promotional outlays as barrier raising loses sight of the
type of advertising purchased. Even the strongest advocate of advertis-
ing as a barrier would be hesitant to label as barriers all advertising
outlays. It is important to know how much of the $70,000 was spent on
"persuasive" advertising, devoid of logic-inducing substance. Here, the
use of trade publication advertising strongly suggests that the promo-
tion may have been more informational.226 If such advertising did not
emotionally bind the user to the product, then manufacturers would
not have found it difficult to attract users by rationally advertising their
product's virtues. Hence, absent classification of the kind of advertising,
it cannot fairly be concluded that Stanley's promotional outlays raised
entry barriers.
The role of advertising as an entry barrier was elevated to a
dominant status in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.227 The Supreme
Court first recoiled at the fact that Procter 8c Gamble allocated some
$127 million per year to advertising and promotion, compared to the
$5.4 million spent by Clorox.228 Tacitly underlying this juxtaposition
of figures was the assumption that Procter & Gamble would spend more
than Clorox did on its liquid bleach promotion after the acquisition.
Mr. Justice Douglas went on to point out the other barrier-creating
advantages of Procter & Gamble's large outlay. Large volume media
223 It is assumed that a capital requirement must be substantially higher than a
continuing advertising expense to maintain a comparable barrier. One of the weaknesses
of any such assumption is that precise measurement criteria have never been laid down,
making strict comparison difficult. See notes 345-77 and accompanying text infra.
224 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 21,698.
225 Stanley's 1971 sales were $300 million, most of which apparently came from
hardware products. 1972 MOODY'S INDUSTRiAL MANNUAL 3011-12. If it be assumed that
advertising as a barrier is measured by the percentage of sales revenues expended for
advertising, then it would be important to know this percentage. While that information
was not disclosed in Stanley, the percentage was probably quite small.
226 It is difficult to imagine a building contractor being persuaded to buy a Stanley
product because a pretty girl was shown using it in an advertisement.
227 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
228 Id. at 572-73.
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discounts, lower per product expenses for the printing and mailing of
promotional material, and greater flexibility in network television ad-
vertising were all thought to benefit the respondent in ways apparently
unavailable to a one-product firm or to new entrants.2 9 Its large adver-
tising budget was also thought to give Procter 8c Gamble an ability, un-
possessed by Clorox alone, to drive out new competition. 23 0 Query
whether the Court's attack bears more relevance to Procter's overall
operation than to this specific acquisition. The Court did not present
findings on the advertising disadvantages suffered specifically by Clorox
-a seemingly logical inquiry to make if one is interested in the com-
petitive changes an acquisition is likely to bring.
Courts have been far more concerned than economists with the
importance of bigness per se as a barrier to entry.231 This concern per-
vades the Procter & Gamble opinion. After cataloguing the advantages
over others which Procter's size engendered, the Court concluded that
"[A] new entrant would be much more reluctant to face the giant
Procter than it would have been to face the smaller Clorox. '232 Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring, railed at the court for failing to set stan-
dards for determining whether the size of Procter in the bleach industry
would, in fact, be anticompetitive.23 3 His opinion certainly reflected the
economists' hesitancy to label bigness blindly as a barrier to entry.
Two years earlier in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,234 a fact
situation not unlike that in Procter & Gamble, the Supreme Court
concluded that Consolidated's acquisition of Gentry would discourage
new entry in the dehydrated onion industry.2 35 The Court juxtaposed
the smallness of Gentry and the industry as a whole, with the bigness
of Consolidated to reach its conclusion. 23
6
229 Id. at 572-73, 579.
230 Id. at 573, 579. The opinion has been criticized on the ground that the supposed
advertising advantages the Court recites are no greater for Procter than they were for
Clorox and they do not, therefore, create higher barriers. See Peterman, supra note 171,
at 396.
Mr. Justice Harlan concluded generally that no advertising efficiencies were proven
and notedrather academically that advertising is not always anticompetitive. 386 U.S.
at 603-04 (Harlan, J., concurring). Even if the evidence is weak, the holding still stands
for the proposition that if the advertising advantages did exist, they would account for
high entry barriers.
231 See generally Day, Conglomerate Mergers and "The Curse of Bigness," 42 N.C.L.
REV. 511 (1964).
232 FTC v. Procter S. Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967).
233 Id. at 589.
234 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
235 Id. at 601.
236 Id. at 600.
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The Sixth Circuit refused to allow United States Steel, New York's
largest cement seller, to integrate vertically by acquiring New York's
largest concrete producer, because of the likelihood that United States
Steel would extend all the competitively debilitating consequences of
its bigness into the concrete market and enhance its power in its own
market as well.23 7 Apart from foreclosing markets to would-be entrants,
the integrated United States Steel would have possessed the deeper
pocket and the enhanced pricing leverage (by having a permanent
buyer for its products), which would have discouraged most new entry.
Successful entry thereafter would have required the same integration
that United States Steel would have attained. The psychological appre-
hension that smaller rivals would have felt in competing against the
large, integrated firm was also mentioned by the court as a factor in-
hibiting entry.M8
Similarly, United Shoe's usurpation of the second-hand market
for its machines (by requiring leases and forbidding outright customer
purchase) and its control of the repair market made its domination of
the shoe machinery market ever greater. The court, with an eye to
eviscerating this bigness, required United to begin selling, rather than
leasing, its machines.239 Implicit in its findings was the idea that the
immensity of United Shoe within the industry gave it the power to
execute its plans and deter entry. In both United States Steel and
United Shoe the courts leaned heavily on all the unfavorable aspects of
vertical integration, not just the entry barring one. Both courts, how-
ever, specifically showed an aversion to the size of the parties and em-
phasized the effects of the anticompetitive practices on likely smaller
entrants.
At the Commission level, the FTC has used the bigness issue quite
creatively. In Brillo Manufacturing Co.,240 the Commission noted the
smallness of the steel wool industry and Brillo's dominance in the field
which made entry unattractive.24 1 The steel wool industry was incred-
ibly concentrated, with the top two firms accounting for 88 percent of
the market.24 2 New firms could never obtain sufficient market size to
become profitable.243 But the Commission prohibited the proposed
237 United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599, 603-05 (6th Cir. 1970).
238 Id. at 605.
239 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325, 340, 343
(D. Mass. 1953).
240 1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. RE. 16,543 (FTC 1963).
241 Id. at 21,471.
242 Id. at 21,469-70.
243 Id. at 21,471.
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merger by going beyond this showing of market power to detail the
relative bigness of Brillo in the Lilliputian steel wool industry.24
In Freuhauf Trailer Co.,245 the Commission rebutted the assertion
that 104 new entrants in the truck trailer industry made Freuhauf's
combination with two other companies defensible, by noting that none
of those entrants were big enough to service the large accounts which
the combination could service.246 There were only eight large-account
sellers prior to Freuhauf's action, with Freuhauf the largest.247 Also,
the 104 new entrants together accounted for only 4.6 percent of the
market.2 4s The Commission rejected the theory that any of those 104
firms could ever be as competitive as the two firms assimilated by
Freuhauf.249 Since the older firms offered a breadth of products signifi-
cantly different from those of the newer companies, the Commission
could have dispensed with the recent entrants more easily by framing
the relevant product line to exclude them. There was no evidence that
the newer entrants competed in the market of the larger firms. By their
demands, the large, multi-need, bulk purchasers created a viable sub-
market in which only eight firms ever competed. The FTC, in fact,
noted that historically the small firms had never competed with the
large firms. 250
Only in United Shoe did the court deal with evidence of limit-type
pricing.251 The court did not relate limit pricing to barring new en-
trants, but rather to barring old competitors from expanding produc-
tion into areas which United Shoe dominated.2 52 Such pricing occurred
only when United felt threatened by the imminence of competition in
the area.258 The court remarked that the traditional formula for setting
prices generally was sufficiently crude to accommodate a sub rosa limit
scheme, and that prices were, in fact, cut below the monopoly level
which United could otherwise impose when the need was felt.2 4 At
times, United mistakenly priced even below its out-of-pocket ex-
penses255-an extreme, if theoretically shabby, example of limit pricing.
244 Id. at 21,471-72.
245 [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,260 (FTC 1965).
246 Id. at 22,361.
247 Id. at 22,360.
248 Id. at 22,361.
249 Id. at 22,363.
250 Id.
251 110 F. Supp. at 325-29.
252 Id. at 325-29.
253 Id. at 326, 327.
254 Id. at 326.
255 Id. at 329.
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Courts have displayed concern in cases brought under section 7 of
the Clayton Act over acquisition of (or by) a "most likely" market en-
trant. A leading case is United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co.,256
which involved the creation of a joint subsidiary by Pennsalt and Olin-
Mathieson to produce and sell sodium chlorate in the southeastern
United States market. The Supreme Court reasoned that the venture
would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act if it precluded either partici-
pant from separately entering the market while the other remained "at
the edge of the market, continually threatening to enter."257 The Court
posited that potential competition was the next best thing to actual
competition. 58 One firm's continual threat to enter would potentially
compel the firms in an oligopolistic market to behave competitively,
lest high profits precipitate invasion. 25 9
The Court's holding in the Penn-Olin case raised some questions.
First, when is a firm's position at the edge of the market so unique that
it must be protected? If other worthy entrants are also lined up at the
edge, why is the preservation of any particular one significant? Second,
what determines whether a firm is actually at the edge of the market?
The Court never came to grips with the first question, leaving an as-
sumption that these must have been the only potential entrants. How-
ever, a year after Penn-Olin was established, 260 another entry was made
into the southeastern market.261 As to the second question, the Court
cited the companies' resources, know-how, and capacity to enter, rely-
ing heavily on feasibility studies regarding independent entry made by
employees of the venturers themselves.262 The district court, on remand,
decided that the recommendations from those studies were legitimately
rejected by top management and that no independent intentions to
enter were shown.2
63
256 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
257 Id. at 173.
258 Id. at 174. Since one firm, Penn.Olin, did enter, the Court must have implicitly
concluded that two potential competitors are superior to one actual competitor. But see
Backman, Joint Ventures in the Light of Recent Antitrust Developments: Joint Ventures
in the Chemical Industry, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 7 (1965). Professor Backman argues that he
"would give more weight to the bird in hand than to two in the bush." Id. at 9.
259 378 U.S. at 174.
260 On remand, the district court decided that neither producer would have inde-
pendently entered, and the joint venture could be allowed. United States v. Penn-Olin
Chem. Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (Dl. Del. 1965), aff'd, 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (4-4 decision).
261 See Berger & Peterson, supra note 151, at 499.
262 378 U.S. at 175.
263 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 246 F.2d Supp. 917, 925-28, 934 (1965).
This substantiates the findings made by Backman in his study of the antitrust aspects of
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In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,264 decided just before
Penn-Olin, the Supreme Court had an easier time voiding the acquisi-
tion of Pacific Northwest Pipeline by El Paso. Like Pennsalt and Olin,
Pacific had not entered the relevant market (California natural gas),
but unlike those companies, it had made overt, albeit vain attempts
to do so. Pacific had been outbid on a contract to sell gas to a California
utility by El Paso. El Paso's competitive response and Pacific's con-
tinued aggressive, resourceful efforts to enter that controlled market
adequately demonstrated Pacific's impact.265 The emergence of two
other entrants into the market after the merger did not affect the
Court's decision. This clear presence of potential entrants (demon-
strated by no better proof than their subsequent entry), coupled with
the complete ignorance of other potential entrants in Penn-Olin, un-
derscores the importance that the Supreme Court has apparently at-
tached to preserving as many potential competitors as possible.2 60
The Supreme Court struck down the Clorox-Procter & Gamble
merger partly because Procter's influence at the edge of the liquid
bleach market would have been negated.267 While Clorox did fear the
entry of Procter, it was similarly wary of Lever Brothers and Colgate-
Palmolive.2 8 Here again, the Court overlooked the position of Procter
as a potential entrant vis--vis other potential entrants equally capable
the chemical industry. He found that despite the existence of criteria by which entry
feasibility may be determined, prediction of the number or identity of likely entrants is
impossible. See Backman, supra note 258, at 12-14.
26 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
265 Id. at 660-61. Low discovered that Pacific was more bark than bite. Low 541.
Although the company was aggressive, its low profits did not give it much real influence.
266 In contrast to the Court, Backman states that there were no anticompetitive
consequences to the disappearance of one potential entrant if others remained in the
field. See Backman, supra note 258, at 10-12. He neglects to say how many others, but
his lowest numbered hypothetical was five. Id.
267 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
268 Berger & Peterson, supra note 151, at 500. Armentano took an even broader view
of the existence of potential entrants in his focus on the Commission's handling of the
case:
Why the FTC believed Procter to be virtually the only prospect for entry was
never explained. Why weren't Colgate-Palmolive, Lever Brothers, B.T. Babbit,
or any number of large firms making related household products considered as
potential competitors? Weren't these firms as likely--or as unlikely-to enter
the bleach industry as Procter? In fact, why weren't any of America's industrial
giants considered potential competitors? Weren't they "potential" enough? Since
the FTC decided to play it "deuces wild" when they introduced one "potential"
competitor, Procter, they should have been prepared to admit that there could
have been many other potential competitors. That the number of potential com-
petitors was reduced by one (and that one became an active competitor in the
bleach industry), therefore, certainly cannot lead to the FTC conclusion that
competition in the bleach industry was substantially lessened because Procter
bought Clorox.
D. ARmENTANO, supra note 159, at 267 (emphasis in original).
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of entering the market. Contrary to previous cases, however, it did
recognize that the "number of potential entrants was not so large that
the elimination of one would be insignificant."26 9 Curiously, the ulti-
mate order forcing the divestment of Clorox by Procter also forbade
the independent entry of Procter into the liquid bleach market for five
years. 270 This rendered nugatory any restraining influence Procter
might have had as a potential competitor, at least for that period.271
The latest Supreme Court treatment of this issue was in Ford
Motor Co. v. United States,272 in which the Court relied on section 7 of
the Clayton Act in ordering Ford to divest its Autolite spark plug
acquisition.27 Mr. Justice Douglas accepted the district court's finding
that Ford's independent perch at the edge of the replacement spark
plug market was more helpful to market competition than had it en-
tered by merger.274 This was because Ford's entry by acquisition would
have removed from prominence the previous independent supplier to
Ford and ended Ford's influence over replacement plug prices. 275 Ford
probably exerted such influence because of the fear of firms in the mar-
ket that high profits would induce Ford to enter. The Court did not con-
cern itself with other potential entrants, probably because the oligopo-
listic nature of the auto industry made such analysis academic. The
ability to generate interest in entry was within the power of the auto-
makers, including Ford, since they were the major buyers. Not surpris-
ingly, the spark plug industry mirrored the auto industry with a "big
three." The Court prohibited Ford from entering the spark plug
market for ten years and from using its name on other spark plugs for
five years.276 This order seems as inconsistent with the holding as was
the order in Procter because it locked Ford out of the market for five
years more than its projected start-up time.277 Accordingly, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger, objected, stressing that Ford's pre-acquisition influence
at the edge of the market would be subverted by the order.278
269 386 U.S. at 581.
270 Berger & Peterson, supra note 151, at 500.
271 Id. It cannot be assumed that the Court had no alternative remedy. Two possible
remedies would have been: (1) to allow Procter & Gamble to develop internally a compet-
ing liquid bleach, or (2) to allow Procter & Gamble to acquire an incidental manufacturer
of bleach (there were 200) and thereby obtain a toehold in the liquid bleach market with
the capacity to later threaten major competition against Clorox.
272 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 567-68.
275 Id. at 568.
276 Id. at 572.
277 Id. at 591, 591 n.4.
278 Id. at (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For those five
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Two recent Federal Trade Commission decisions have treated
entry barriers rather extensively, one acceptably,279 the other less S0.280
Each merits special consideration. The Bendix Corp.,28s reflects the
frequent misuse of barrier theory. There, the Commission required
Bendix, a manufacturer of automobile parts, to divest itself of recently-
acquired Fram, the third largest producer of automotive filters.28 2
Despite the industry's decreasing (albeit high) concentration, the Com-
mission held that apart from the imminence of Bendix's independent
entry into the market, its ability to make a toehold entry by acquisition
warranted a decision to unravel its merger with Fram.283
The opinion of the Commission utilized all the barrier criteria
discussed above. It noted that from 1962 to 1969 "only" three new en-
tries had been made, and only one since 1963.284 It is difficult to assess
the significance of this finding as a barrier measurer in light of the fact
that there were only about thirty manufacturers of filters prior to
1962.285 A ten percent increase in competitors in a seven-year period,
contrary to the Commission's conclusion, could easily suggest low entry
barriers.280
The Commission acknowledged that neither scale economies287 nor
cost advantages stood as entry barriers. 288 But it regarded promotional
programs, of the types previously identified as raising product differen-
tiation advantages, as significant barriers to entry.289 Although the Com-
mission's opinion emphasized that the largest competitors mounted the
years, Ford could not even generate trade acceptance of its "Ford" branded spark plug,
thus retarding its ability to compete actively for up to 13 years.
279 Beatrice Foods Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,121 (FTC Sept. 28, 1972).
280 Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,288 (FTC 1970), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
281 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,288 (FTC 1970).
282 Id. at 21,454.
283 Id. at 21,439, 21,441, 21,44447.
284 Id. at 21,452.
285 Id. at 21,441.
286 One entrant produced filters only, the second produced other auto parts as well,
and the third, Ford Motor Company, was an auto industry giant. Id. at 21,452 n.70.
Potential entrants from all "walks of life" had apparently been attracted to, and suc-
ceeded in, the industry. This factor is hardly indicative of high entry barriers.
287 Id. at 21,451 n.64.
288 Id. The Commission stated that "Etihe manufacture of most automotive filters
involves relatively simple, unsophisticated, and well-known technology, and there are no
important existing patents." Id. at 21,441.
289 Id. at 21,451-52. Manufacturers utilized promotional plans involving bonus give-
aways, contests, and the like. They also employed scores of "missionary" men to promote
the product and build the brand allegiance of the retail and distributor trade. The
opinion noted that the three largest filter manufacturers each employed over 100 such
missionary men. Id. at 21,452.
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most grandiose promotions, the court's opinion on appeal observed that
smaller companies were profitable and also actively promoted their
products.290 If the smaller companies did not incur promotional costs
comparable to those of the larger firms, which is fair to suppose, yet
were still profitable, then use of the promotional costs model of the
largest companies is misleading.291 Therefore, the promotional expense
required for a newcomer to become a viable industry competitor may
be considerably less than the Commission suggests. If so, such expense
may stand as a considerably milder barrier to entry. However, the
Commission's characterization of the high industry advertising inten-
sity, as opposed to other promotions, as artificially raising entry barriers
may be more trustworthy than its other barrier analysis.292
The FTC regarded the industry presence of two corporate giants,
General Motors and Ford, as a primary entry barrier.2 93 Their "sheer
size" and their ability to modify engine design and warranty in order
to inhibit the use of other filters were thought to loom as ominous
deterrents. 294 However, no empirical support for these assumptions was
given. Indeed, the entire discussion is couched in the conditional
tense,205 perhaps reflecting the Commission's own uncertainty as to the
theory's validity.
Citing Procter & Gamble as authority, the opinion concluded that
the number of potential entrants was so small that the withdrawal of
Bendix would likely be competitively significant.298 Yet "only" twenty-
three manufacturers were deemed likely potential entrants217 compared
to the suggestion of three in Procter.298 The Commission chipped away
290 Bendix Corp. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 534, 537-38 (6th Cir. 1971).
291 Although a manufacturer with only 3.2% of the market also employed a 100-
man sales force, it is worth noting that this manufacturer was the seventh largest in
the industry. Bendix Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,288, at 21,439, 21,449 (FTC 1970).
Also, the manufacturer, Hastings, makes many other auto products, the sale of which those
missionary men doubtless also promote. They are not merely full-time filter sellers. See
1972 MooDY'S INDUSRIAL MANUAL 597.
292 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 21,441, 21,452. The Commission found that most industry
members spent some 4% to 5% of sales proceeds in advertising their products to the
trade. Id. at 21,452 n.66. Although part of this advertising was undoubtedly informa-
tional, hence acceptable, the percentage was so high, considering that the advertising was
not directed to consumers, that it strongly suggests much of the advertising was persua-
sive. The Commission also compared the advertising percentages for the filter industry
with those of other industries. Id.
293 Id. at 21,451-52.
294 Id.
295 Id.
298 Id. at 21,452-53.
297 Id. at 21,453.
298 Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1540-41, 1578-79 (1963).
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at this large number by conjecturing that some would be deterred by
the presence of General Motors and Ford, others would lack the exper-
tise to compete, and still others would lack the resources.299 The
Commission concluded that apart from Bendix, only one potential
competitor, Chrysler, had a salutary effect on the edge of the market.800
The Commission did not consider the possibility that other companies
not theretofore evincing an interest in entering might later do so.
Additionally, the Commission, without precedent, tacitly assumed a
more restrictive antiacquisition posture toward the strongest likely
entrant than would be the case toward a weaker, but still "most likely,"
entrant. Such an approach transcends the economic view that only the
maintenance of some potential entrants, capable of exercising a pro-
competitive effect on the market, is important.30'
The most recent Federal Trade Commission pronouncement re-
garding entry barriers was much more thoughtfully considered. In
Beatrice Foods Co.,80 2 the Commission held a merger between Beatrice
and Sexton Foods lawful even though Beatrice, a retail grocery distrib-
utor, would be precluded from entering a specialized institutional dry
grocery market in which Sexton had theretofore been competing inde-
pendently. The crucial factor for the Commission was the failure to
show that there were no other food distributors able to enter the field
or that entry was so difficult that Beatrice's loss on the horizon would
be competitively significant. 0 3
In a carefully written opinion, Commissioner Dennison first re-
jected the notion that market shares were at all relevant when, as here,
the condition of entry was shown to be so low. 04 He then examined
299 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 21,452-53. To show the invalidity of this "chiseling"
process, it is interesting to remember that the third largest filter manufacturer had less
than $40 million in assets, with annual sales of less than $70 million. Id. at 21,441. It
is not clear that a significant competitive influence would necessitate a comparable level
of expenditure; however, the opinion makes it relevant that only 7 of the 14 auto-related
potential entrants had sales over $100 million. Id. at 21,453 n.73. If the cost of viable
entry would have been calculated on this basis alone, even most "small" (i.e., less than
$100 million in sales) companies considering entry would have had little difficulty in
actually entering the field. Viable entry, of course, would not have required the entrant to
become the third largest seller immediately.
800 Id. at 21,453. In Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), Ford was
the largest potential entrant. However, the Court was not confronted with the existence
of any other likely entrants. Therefore, if Ford had been prohibited from entering, the
only viable entrant would have been eliminated from the field.
301 See Backman, supra note 258, at 11-13.
302 3 TRADE REG. ReP. 20,121 (FTC Sept. 28, 1972).
803 Id. at 22,109-10.
304 Id. at 22,109. The hearing examiner himself effectively ruled that market share
was not relevant by finding a violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, notwithstanding that
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each specific barrier, finding none to be substantial enough to deter
new entry.305 He noted that the evidence amply demonstrated a history
of high entry into the industry along with a large number of major,
would-be entrants perched on its edge.3086
The Commission's work may have been made somewhat easier by
the knowledge that the market shares involved were small-between
one and four percent for the acquired company in the national mar-
ket.307 In the Procter & Gamble, Penn-Olin, El Paso, and Ford cases,
which used barrier theory to decide against the respondents, market
share analysis alone might have indicated a violation. 0 Viewed in this
light, it is not dear that either the courts or the Commission are yet
responding directly to barrier criteria.309 Arguably, Commissioner Den-
nison adopted the barrier approach to buttress what might have been a
dismissal by market share analysis, had a clearer finding been avail-
able.31  Thus, one is led to cautiously conclude that barrier analysis is
being utilized as a make-weight at best.
he found "active competition" and a "substantially fragmented trade." In re Beatrice
Foods Co., No. 8814, at 22-24 (FTC, May 17, 1971). Using the Penn-Olin test, he found
Beatrice to be a "most likely entrant" into the subject industry and Sexton a leading
firm in the industry, and on these bases ordered divestment. Id.
It should be noted that the market share determination in this case was very suspect.
Id. at 15-21. The examiner was apparently unable to ascertain a true measure of the
market, and he stated that the "best" he could do was to "averag[e the] various claims."
Id. at 20.
805 3 TRADE REG. REP. at 22,111, 22,118-15. The Commissioner eliminated economies
of scale as factors. Id. at 22,113. Maximum efficiency was reached by maintaining a nominally
minimum sales volume. Cost advantages were only slightly felt in the capital market, but
the industry was not capital-intensive. Only a warehouse and a few trucks, all of which
could be leased, were needed to operate. Also, supplies were readily available. Neither
advertising nor product differentiation was found significant. Id. at 22,114-15. Size was
also rejected as a barrier since there was no showing of specific harm therefrom. Id.
300 Id. at 22,113-14. The number of institutional distributors had grown from 1,500
to 2,500 between 1964 and 1970. Commissioner Dennison listed by name 14 major corpora-
tions that had displayed an interest in entering the market including Armour, Borden,
Ralston-Purina, and HJ. Heinz. Id. at 22,113.
807 However, the Commission ignored the national figures, feeling that the relevant
market was regional or local. Although there were conflicting views as to the number of
companies includable in the relevant market, the Commission did not find it necessary to
challenge the validity of the examiner's findings as to market share. Id. at 22,107-09.
808 In Procter, Clorox had nearly 50% of the liquid bleach market. 386 U.S. at 571.
In Penn-Olin, the joint venture's share of the relevant market was 27.6% with only four
firms competing. 378 U.S. at 165. In El Paso, El Paso had all of the market, but Pacific
Northwest would have had a substantial share if it had entered. 376 U.S. at 658-59. And
in Ford, Autolite had 15% of the market in a three company industry. 405 U.S. at 566.
309 Concededly, the industry instances of high concentration and low barriers to
entry may be infrequent. So may be the chance to respond.
310 The decision does not dispute the examiner's finding of a "substantially frag-
mented" trade. Id. at 22,107-09.
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The foregoing survey has covered many of the cases in which bar-
rier theory has been applied or misapplied. There also have been some
cases amenable to barrier theory to which it has not been applied.
Two examples will suffice. The case which has generated the most
comment81 is United States v. Von's Grocery Co.,Jm 2 in which Mr.
Justice Black ruled that the absolute drop in the number of super-
markets in the Los Angeles area indicated a "trend toward concen-
tration" which justified the Court in annulling the Von's-Shopping
Bag merger. 13 His opinion lacked even a word about entry barriers.
In dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart took up the tack. He fully recog-
nized the ease of entering the supermarket industry. 14 There were no
high capital requirements, no required patents or trade secrets, and
no significant product differentiation. The incidence of entry and the
number of prospective competitors was high. 15 Mr. Justice Stewart
chided the court for misapprehending the present nature of the
market. 16 The diminution of "mom and pop" stores was attributable
more to new consumer shopping habits than to any anticompetitive
market behavior. 17 The new market was more heavily composed of
chains, but the history of entry and exit of these chains was "turbu-
lent."8 18 As Professor Richard E. Low concluded, the Court had a "dear
opportunity" to accept ease of entry as a defense "but did not take
advantage of it."'31 Its "oversight" in this case-one well qualified
for the use of barrier analysis-suggests that the Court has been em-
ploying a random technique for resolving economic issues relating to
alleged antitrust law violations.8 20
311 See, e.g., Hutchinson, Comment on the Von's Merger Case, I Asrrnmusr L. &
EcoN. R v., Spring 1968, at 101. Even the Attorney General's Committee To Study the
Antitrust Laws was moved to comment on the Von's case. See THE ATrORNEY GENERAL's
NATIONAL COMmITEE To STuDy THE ANTrrausY IAws, ANr'rusr DaVs.opmEN-rs 1955-1968,
at 77 n.83 (1968).
312 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
313 Id. at 272-74.
814 Id. at 800 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
315 Id.
316 Id. at 288-89.
317 Id. at 288.
318 Id. at 291-92.
319 Low 517.
320 Concerning Von's, Professor Hutchinson lamented:
It is hard to escape the conclusion that, at least as of the date.., the Court
handed down its opinion . . . its members had no real understanding of the
economic concept of "competition" and thus of the economic policy the nation's
economists have long assumed to be quite firmly embodied in our national anti-
trust laws .... [IThe Von's case, in short, represents an unfortunate ... chapter
in the Court's administration of the country's antitrust policy ....
Hutchinson, supra note 311, at 106.
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The Supreme Court, in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,321 listed
barriers to entry as a factor generally to be considered in viewing chal-
lenged mergers,32 2 but then ignored them in its own consideration of
the Brown-Kinney merger. Entry into both the manufacturing and
retailing ends of the shoe industry was relatively easy.323 Therefore,
the Court's reliance on the decreasing numbers of manufacturers is
not compelling.324 It likely says more about conditions of exit than
conditions of entry. Entry and exit do not necessarily reflect the same
market conditions. 25 Arguably, if entry barriers were still low, the
anticompetitive effects of increasing concentration could be mitigated.
The Court seemed to be greatly alarmed by the increasing vertical
integration and consequent market foreclosure in the shoe industry.
However, even on this point, the figures are ambiguous. Of 70,000
retail shoe outlets, only 4,944 were listed as linked to manufacturers. 326
True, this list may not be exhaustive, but the Court probably left
out few significant integrated operations. There was no suggestion of
decreasing numbers of retailers, nor of any lessening ability of inde-
pendent retailers to purchase shoes. Furthermore, even manufacturer-
owned stores were not always compelled to purchase their owner's prod-
uct exclusively.327 Neither the retailing nor manufacturing ends of
the merger were frustrated by the threat of market foreclosure, so long
as the vast bulk of retail outlets remained either unaffiliated or free
to buy where they pleased. The entry issue seems particularly relevant
here as the market share figures provide scant evidence of presumptive
violation. 28
B. Merger Guidelines
Before concluding the analysis, a look at the Justice Department's
Merger Guidelines29 is appropriate. The Guidelines prescribe general
standards for merger law enforcement, emphasizing the elements of
market structure that determine the conditions of competition (spe-
321 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
322 Id. at 322.
323 In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
the court noted that entry into shoe manufacturing was "easy." There was no historic lack
of entry and no large capital requirement. Id. at 301. Shoe retailing entry conditions have
been characterized as "not particularly difficult:' SCHERER 251.
824 370 U.S. at 301.
325 See Low 528.
826 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1962).
327 For example, even the retail stores owned by Kinneys purchased only 20% of
their shoes from Kinneys' manufacturing plants. Id. at 303.
328 See id. at 302-03.
329 U.S. DEP'T OF JusrIcE, MERGER GumnLINES (1968).
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cifically concentration, market shares, and entry barriers).330 For hori-
zontal mergers, however, no guidance is provided for defining entry
barriers or measuring their height. Market share analysis plus other
nonshare critera unrelated to entry barriers would seem to be the
only tests for proving horizontal violation. 33'
Vertical merger analysis leans more heavily on determination of
entry conditions. 32 The Guidelines spell out fairly precisely what kinds
of barriers may signal a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.333
Foreclosing markets to potential customers or suppliers, possibly neces-
sitating entry in an integrated form, exposing new competitors to
price and supply squeezes, and increasing opportunities for product
differentiation are the barriers vertical mergers are thought most likely
to raise 3 4 Increased economies of scale were not thought to raise sig-
nificant barriers to entry, partly because optimal economies usually
occur at a size too small to arouse the Justice Department3 35 and partly
because such barriers are thought to be overshadowed in vertical
mergers by others more damaging and less defensible, especially the
barrier of foreclosure of nonintegrated entry.33 6 Recognizing the in-
herent difficulties in projecting future market conditions after a vertical
merger occurs, the Guidelines suggest that the primary test be market
shares and present entry conditions in the involved industries. 3 7
With regard to conglomerate mergers, the Guidelines suggest
prosecution where the acquisition involves a potential entrant and
an existing competitor with a fixed percentage (enumerated therein)
market share.338 Any acquisition of a likely entrant by a present com-
petitor, made in order to avoid the likely disruption of such entry,
would also be challengeable. 339 An acquisition which generally "may
serve to entrench or increase the market power of the acquiring firm
or raise barriers to entry in that market" would further precipitate Jus-
tice Department action. 40
Not unlike the courts, the Merger Guidelines rely heavily on
market share criteria. Where the Justice Department feels the safest,
330 Id. at 2.
331 See id. at 7-12.
832 Id. at 13.
333 Id. at 13-14.
334 Id. at 14.
335 See id. at 19, 20.
336 Id. at 14, 15.
337 Id. at 15.
338 Id. at 21-22.
330 Id. at 23.
340 Id. at 25.
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that is, in the area of horizontal mergers, it relies most heavily on that
standard.38 " The failure to utilize entry criteria for horizontal mergers
seems to be a weakness, especially in light of the barriers recognized
by economists and courts that are raised by horizontal combination.
Otherwise, entry barriers, though not predominant, are at least recog-
nized as more significant than past cases have suggested. The Guidelines
single out product differentiation for special consideration,8 2 reflecting
more the economists' view of its importance than the view of prosecu-
tors, courts, and possibly Congress. They also attempt to cure some
of the problems left unsolved by El Paso and Penn-Olin, regarding
potential entrants,343 by interjecting a facile concentration standard
with little consideration for the number of potential entrants.8"4
IV
BARRIER MEASUREMENT
Having decided that barriers to entry deserve more attention, the
next step is to determine how they fit into present and future antitrust
law enforcement plans. The primary problem with any application is
that entry barriers are difficult to quantify. They are irregular and ap-
proximate, frequently rely on subjective evaluation,8 45 and must be
determined individually for each industry.846 Additionally, the data
841 See id. at 8-10.
342 Id. at 14, 25.
843 Id. at 21-23.
844 The Guidelines' exclusive concentration approach is departed from only where
the market falls into its least concentrated category (top 8 with 75% of the market). Then,
an action would be brought if "there are no more than one or two likely entrants into the
market." Id. at 22. One wonders if any industry would have so few likely entrants at its
edge. For more concentrated industries, however, all that is required for action is that it
involve "one of the most likely entrants," irrespective of the number of others. Id. (empha-
sis added). The Guidelines' approach to determining the most likely potential entrants
accords primary significance to the firm's capability of entering on a competitively
significant scale relative to the capability of other firms (i.e., the technological
and financial resources available to it) and to the firm's economic incentive to enter
(evidenced by, for example, the general attractiveness of the market in terms of
risk and profit; or any special relationship of the firm to the market; or the firm's
manifested interest in entry; or the natural expansion pattern of the firm; or
the like).
Id. at 22-23. This may be a more rigorous standard for measuring most likely entrants
than is consistent with an apparent policy that diminishes the importance of the number
of likely entrants. It is this author's contention that the quantity, as well as the quality,
of potential entrants may be worth examining in every instance in which complaints
involving such entrants are brought.
845 See BAiN 445.
848 B auwmts 173-74.
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needed to measure them is difficult to regularize. 47 The present goal
is not to offer the substitution of one unreliable method for another,
but rather to put barrier theory to use as much as possible in order to
supplement and improve existing analytical tools and to frame a new
perspective for future enforcement. For these purposes, precise mea-
surement may not be necessary. Nevertheless, it might be instructive
to hazard onto the thin ice of untested theory to suggest guidelines for
the measurement of entry barriers, where possible.
The best method of measuring entry barriers, but the least suscep-
tible to inter-industry analysis, is individual industry study. Bain's
classic study employed only this methods and his results have never
been challenged. Technically, the impact of entry barriers should be
measured by the increased prices the existing competitors may charge
without attracting new entrants.849 However, such figures require a
calculation of barrier impact first by other means and then an effort to
transpose such impact onto a price scale.3 50 The first task is difficult
enough, without the need to extrapolate a second criterion as well. It
is contended that would-be entrants may respond rationally to the
existence of entry barriers, but often do not relate to the specific
deterrence of price disadvantages which would reflect such barriers.3 51
Measuring barriers, per se, better captures the very forces playing on
would-be entrants. 52 This, plus the possibility that a second (price)
347 P. Ascn, supra note 57, at 178. See generally Low 521-24.
348 BARuRwm 48-52.
349 See, eg., Mueller, supra note 2, at 123-24.
350 See text accompanying note 153 supra. United Shoe Machinery, for example, was
unable to price rationally. See text accompanying note 255 supra. However, consider
Mueller's claim that "[C]alculation of the entry-forestalling price is one of the basic skills
every significant firm in a concentrated industry is expected to show considerable pro-
ficiency in." Mueller, supra note 2, at 128.
Even if this statement be accepted, it does not allow for the potential entrant without
pricing expertise whose personal calculation may be too imprecise to offer him guidance,
and who, therefore, may respond unexpectedly to the limit price. On the other hand, this
entrant's perception of such factors as high scale economies or excessive product differen-
tiation may deter his entry, irrespective of possible low price barriers. It is not suggested
that such would-be entrants perceive barriers as analytically as this article attempts to do,
but rather that their perceptions are closer to the barrier approach than to an unrealistic,
factually difficult concept of price disadvantages. If they are deterred, it is directly by
the existence of entry barriers, and only indirectly by the necessity of higher prices upon
entry which would be occasioned by such barriers.
351 See notes 349-50 and accompanying text supra.
852 It also better captures the forces at work on the tribunals. Courts normally do
not frame the traditional tools of evaluating anticompetitiveness with respect to price. It
is never said, for example, that x increase in concentration will lead to y higher prices.
Occasionally, courts will refer to high profits, but specific price information is given less
often. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 403-04 (1956).
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calculation may be less reliable than the initial barrier measure, augurs
against considering barriers in their price differential effects, despite
any comparative advantages of such an approach.
With respect to scale economies, the appropriate measure would
be the market share required by a firm producing at minimally
full efficiency. According to questionnaire responses,3 53 Bain calculated
percentages for his sample. From his findings it can be generalized that
industries with maximum economies at scales of production supplying
at least eight percent of the relevant market have high barriers, three
to eight percent moderate barriers, and less than three percent low
barriers 4 Other more technical devices for approaching scale econo-
mies have been suggested but their reliability has been challenged,355
and they are best left for use in pre-litigation policy planning, where
only relative precision is required.
Cost advantages are more difficult to measure quantitatively than
scale economies.3 56 Nevertheless, some untested guidelines are sug-
It is, therefore, folly to require entry barriers to stand up to a sterner test of measure-
ment than other criteria the courts presently use.
353 Here is a sample of the questions asked of the cement firms in order to deduce
scale economies in their industry.
Concerning the size of plant or of firm necessary for maximum efficiency in
the cement industry:
A. What, in your opinion, is the most efficient size of a single plant (in
terms of daily or annual output capacity) for producing cement?
B. How much higher would costs per unit of output be with plants of suc-
cessfully smaller size-e.g. one-half or one-fourth of the most efficient size?
C. What would be the current investment, including working capital, neces-
sary to establish a single plant of the most efficient size?
D. Are there evident reductions of production cost attainable by a firm
through growing to a size where it operates several plants of efficient size? Of
distribution cost? If so, how large, in terms of overall output capacity, would
the firm need to become to attain maximum efficiency? How much lower costs
could it then attain than an efficient single-plant firm?
E. What would be the principal sources of production or distribution cost
reduction to such a large firm?
F. What would be the current investment necessary to establish a cement
firm of the most efficient size?
BARUtEas 225-26. Bain related responses to these questions to total industry output avail-
able from other sources in order to obtain market share measurement. Id. at 47, 68-71.
354 See BAMuuzs 71-93. Bain's work contains an extensive discussion of scale economies.
Id. It is truncated here because of the limited importance of scale economies as a factor
in antitrust litigation. Bain's measure of scale economies, with respect to market share,
avoids the difficulty of defining the relevant product and geographic market. See text
accompanying notes 19-22 supra. By taking his sample findings from national markets in
very general product industries, as suggested by his use of census data, he skirted much of
the problem. See BARRIERS 47.
355 See, e.g., Saving, Estimation of Optimum Size of Plant by the Survivor Technique,
75 Q.J. EcoN. 569 (1961); Shepherd, What Does the Survivor Technique Show About
Economies of Scale?, 34 S. ECON. J. 113 (1967).
350 Bain asked the cement manufacturers only the briefest questions on cost advan-
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gested here. With regard to patents, there may be two, not necessarily
mutually exclusive, approaches. One would be to determine the per-
centage of the production process or product of a firm that is un-
duplicable due to either product or manufacturing facility patents 5 7
Presumably, Xerox and Polaroid would pose high barriers on this ac-
count, while Del Monte, a food processor, would not. Patents would
constitute a high barrier if more than half3 58 the process or product
could not be duplicated because of them. It also would be significant to
know when the term of these entry-forestalling patents expired.5 9
The second approach would be to ascertain the number of super-
fluous patents held by a firm which block competitive circumvention
of primary patents. The accumulation of twenty-five percent more
patents than the firm is presently applying, could be construed as
raising high barriers. High barriers would also be present if even one
key patent were shown to be guarded by a shield of two or three
redundant patents. The firm could offer the defense that presently
superfluous patents represent an advancement of present technology
and would be utilized at a later time. Expert testimony could likely
show which firm's patents are utilized and which are not.860
The cornering of resources in the relevant market as a barrier to
tages, producing a descriptive, rather than quantitative, estimate of their force as barriers.
BAaUuEas 151, 226. Following are the questions asked:
Concerning advantages of lower production cost to established firms.
A. Assuming that a new firm were to build to a size comparable with that
of the most efficient established firms, would it nevertheless tend to incur
higher production costs for any reason, and if so, by about how much? For
example, would it suffer perceptibly from:
(1) Higher costs of financing?
(2) Inability to obtain expert management personnel?
(8) Lack of production "know-how"?
(4) Higher costs of any raw material or equipment item?
Id. at 226.
857 One would not necessarily expect to find a string of patents foredosing entry.
However, if one critical patent prevented duplication of 60% of a production process or
product, it would be considered as destructive as several.
858 All percentages or other figures used hereafter are largely the whim of the author.
For various industries and circumstances, barriers may be raised at levels unrelated to
the figures set out herein. More intensive multi-industry analysis may be required to ham-
mer out truly reliable figures.
859 It might be introduced in mitigation of a high barrier measure that the relevant
patents would be expiring within five years, i.e., within the period that antitrust litigation
frequently takes.
360 This thought on overall patent measurement may suggest that all patents are
equal, i.e., produced or imitated with equal development cost, or possessed of equal
usefulness. The author readily admits that any such suggestion is invalid. If, then, the
two-point plan fails by this shortcoming, at least, the basic concepts can remain as guides
without numerical analysis.
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entry is apparent only when the resources are rare, hence finite and
measurable. In such situations, it should be easy to determine the per-
centage of an outstanding resource which is held by a firm. If new
entry is deterred merely by the economic unavailability of more than
sixty to seventy-five percent of a necessary resource, then the company
holding that amount can be said to create high barriers. One difficulty
in computing this percentage is that the economically usable supply
upon which it is based may vary with the extent of competing uses
to which the resource will be put in unrelated markets.
Capital requirements can be compared easily since they are mea-
sured in dollars, and the figures are not difficult to obtain. The stan-
dard by which capital requirements are measured is the cost of estab-
lishing one minimally efficient business operation. Bain found that
capital requirements vary depending upon the industry into which
entry is sought.361 For general purposes, however, entry costs of between
$10 and $50 million were characterized as high, with a requirement of
between $2.5 and $10 million viewed as moderate, and less than $2.5
million seen as low.362 A realistic present-day appraisal would designate
capital requirements above $25 million as high, those between $8
million and $25 million as moderate, and those below $8 million as
low.
In the abstract, such figures may not be particularly helpful. A
meaningful evaluation of capital requirements as entry barriers must
consider both the nature of the industry and the characteristics of
specific potential entrants. For example, a large conglomerate with
deep pockets may be deterred from entry only when the capital re-
quirement is over $50 million, while an individual may be deterred
by a $5 million required outlay. For policy reasons, however, even a
conglomerate may be dissuaded from entering a high capital industry
since the risk of loss is greater, and the commitment of capital to one
venture prevents its alternative investment elsewhere. Nevertheless,
the large company could enter when it decided to do so, as a policy
matter, while the smaller firm could not. Still, the number of entrants
will be reduced by high capital requirements, which may be significant
despite their different sizes.363
161 BAsRums 156-60.
362 Id.
863 With respect to research and development, although the percentage of revenues
devoted to it can be easily figured, industries vary substantially in the amount which is
normal, i.e., technologically justified. Therefore, it is imprudent even to guess that an
expenditure of x percent of sales for research constitutes an unnaturally high entry barrier
for every industry. It could not be the purpose of any order to prohibit "natural" re-
search; hence, suggestions for its measurement as a possible barrier are excluded.
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Product differentiation is technically measured by the disparity
of price and/or cost between the product produced by a new entrant
and the competing product of an established firm. 64 While such a
measure cannot always be made, Mueller provides at least two methods
by which it might be estimated.30 5
One method is to average the estimates of competitors as to how
much lower than the price of a leading product the price of an entering
product would need to be in order for the new product to be able
to compete successfully. 6 Of course, as Mueller implies, an accurate
calculation of the maximum price which might be charged by a new
entrant can come only from a newcomer who actually knows the price
difference.867 However, since such knowledgeable newcomers probably
will not be in the highest barrier industries, this method has only
limited usefulness.
Mueller also suggests that the price difference might be measured
by comparing the "private label" product price with the "manufac-
turer's brand" product price to reflect the "consumer preference" (i.e.,
differentiation) for the latter.0 8 This measure, however, has only
limited application. Many products are not sold under a private
label; hence, comparison is impossible.
Another way to "measure" product differentiation is to determine
what proportion of the firm's or industry's product is sold through ex-
clusive distributorships. The continuing influence which a loyal dis-
tributor may have on promoting differentiation in the community is
well-known. Therefore, a measure of the extent of such relationships
should be informative.
For physically identical products, each product presumably should
share an equal percentage of the market, assuming no other variables.
Any deviation from this is almost certain evidence of product dif-
ferentiation,3 9 with the resultant skewing of market shares reflecting
consumer preferences. Given a tribunal's ability to fix a geographic
market, any firm's differentiation advantage could be calculated by the
difference between its share and that share to which it would other-
864 See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
365 Mueller, supra note 37, at 24-28.
866 Id. at 26.
367 Id.
868 Id. at 26-27.
369 Id. at 22-23. Limitations on any one competitor's production or distribution
capability may be the only reasons, other than differentiation, for its less than propor-
tional market share. There is an assumption that if a firm's reputation for a truly higher
quality product accounts for a market share difference, then the products in the relevant
market are not, in fact, physically identical.
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wise be entitled were the market evenly divided among all competitors.
The dominance of one or several companies in a market where all the
products are identical is likely to be noticed by a potential entrant and
viewed by him as a deterrent to entry.
With respect to markets in which there are a multiplicity of prod-
ucts, frequently with functional or quality differences more apparent
than real, it would be appropriate to juxtapose scientific findings with
the results of product-user surveys.3 70 The disparity between user be-
liefs and rational evaluations of scientific analysis may highlight ex-
cessive design changes or variants on one basic product.8 71 The effect
of a spurious "full line" is to create product differentiation and user
loyalty which can pose insurmountable obstacles to possible entrants.
The impact of advertising as a barrier may be measured by the
percentage of industry or firm sales revenue which is spent on it.372
The higher the percentage spent on advertising, the greater the deter-
rence of potential entrants. In many instances, advertising raises high
barriers when industry advertising intensity exceeds seven to ten per-
cent of sales.8 73 There are, however, factors which may alter this
high barrier threshold.
For example, the intensity of advertising may vary with the market
served. If sales are made only to producers, then possibly a smaller
advertising allotment, as a percentage of sales, need be spent to create
high barriers. Advertising rates for specialized trade publications, which
are the prime site of such promotions, are less expensive than those for
870 Apparent differences may be "real" to the consumer psyche. Insofar as a con-
sumer's psychological needs for diversity are ignored, this guideline may be unrealistic
and arguably barbaric. Nevertheless, it is the author's position that subtle product
differences, especially within one manufacturer's line, are not worth the price if they
serve only to block new competition.
871 Such scientific analysis may range from laboratory testing of purportedly unique
cosmetics, to surveying garagemen in order to determine the mechanical differences and
variances in the frequency of repair for automobiles offered as superior to and, accordingly,
priced higher than others of the same manufacturer.
872 It could also be measured by the absolute dollar amount spent by the average
viable firm. Advertising, as a barrier raised by the affirmative action of firm manage-
ment, is normally viewed in terms of "intensity," i.e., as a percentage of revenues. See
generally Shepherd. This makes it possible to set inter-industry comparative standards.
Also, any deterrence must be commensurate with the amount of advertising thought to
be needed for each dollar of revenue return. Industries requiring high absolute outlays
for advertising may not deter entry on that account if the likely consequence of such
expenditures will be proportionally higher sales.
873 Of 100 leading advertisers in 1971, 26 spent 7% of sales or more on advertising.
ADvERTMNG AGE, Aug. 28, 1972, at 26. Twenty-two of those were in the soap-cleanser or
drug-cosmetic categories. Id. Not coincidentally, competing products in these categories
are least physically distinguishable. See generally FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 886 U.S.
568, 572 (1967).
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consumer oriented publications. 74 On the other hand, such advertising,
geared to a more knowledgeable audience, may require more informa-
tional, as opposed to persuasive, content in order to be successful. It,
therefore, may not be of the genre heretofore described as barrier
raising. This may indicate that higher advertising intensity deters entry
only in producer goods industries.375
In any action involving high advertising expenses it should be
allowed as a defense that either the company is new or that it has
introduced a new product, since both necessitate saturation advertising
in order to wean the desired customers away from their previous sup-
pliers. The defense should be infrequently encountered because new
companies are rarely charged with antitrust infractions. 76 Moreover,
such saturation advertising is unlikely to have lasted long enough to
demonstrate a course or pattern of conduct upon which an order to
cease and desist could be realistically based. 77
V
FUTURE DIRECrIoNs wN BARRIER ANALYSIS
It is widely agreed that economies of scale should not normally
be sacrificed merely because they contribute to high entry barriers.378
As a policy matter, the trade-off is between lower production costs with
874 For example, the cost of a black-and-white page of advertising in the professional
periodical, Drug Topics, is approximately $1,466. 54 ThSmFmSS PUBLICATIONS RATES AND
DATA, Dec. 24, 1972, at 339. A comparable advertisement in the roughly parallel consumer
publication, Today's Health, costs some $3,100. 55 CONSUMER MAGAZINE & FARM PUBLICA-
nON Rum.s AN DATA, March 27, 1973, at 207.
375 The assumption is that at some level even informative advertising results in
diminishing returns in informing the user. At that level, its only purpose is to influence
an element other than the user's intellect which effectuates his decision to purchase.
370 Indeed, it is the existence and encouragement of new competitors that this paper
views as a major check on anticompetitive activity. It would be repugnant, from this
standpoint, for the government to turn its sights on a company still recent enough in the
industry to require saturation advertising.
877 Since the analysis has rejected the theory that bigness is an independent factor in
deterring entry, no standards are suggested here for its measurement.
878 See, e.g., KAYsEN & TURNER 78, 114; Scnanra 233.
In their proposed Concentrated Industries Act, the Neal Commission allowed the
following exception for economies of scale: "Such decree shall not require that a firm take
any steps which such firm establishes would result in a substantial loss of economies of
scale." White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, BNA ANrrrausr & TRADE
RtG. REP., No. 411, May 27, 1969, pt. II, at 13 (emphasis added). The provision implies
that some loss of scale economies might be an acceptable by-product of a structural decree.
See also Williamson, supra note 50, at 1525 (dominant companies allowed to defend on
the basis of achieving scale economies from a natural monopoly). This problem, however,
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full economies and less efficient production with more competitors.
Despite the congressional desire to keep barriers porous for small busi-
ness, the creation of an industry with inefficient producers a fortiori
raises production costs and, ultimately, prices. Clearly, the public inter-
est is better served by favoring lower prices, even at the expense of
somewhat restricted entry in certain instances.8 79
Absolute cost advantages also are not usually significant as entry
barriers, 10 and when they are significant, their effects can be mitigated
in the public interest. Courts already have recognized cases of unnatural
accumulation and protection of patents, as in Hartford-Empire.38s
More can be done in this area, however, to minimize the entry-barring
effects of patents. Here, general policy favors some action, for it is the
rights of patent holders only, a far smaller group than the general
public, which must be weighed against the benefits of more competi-
tion. Although patent holders' rights are constitutionally protected,
similarly protected copyright holders are compelled to license all musi-
cal compositions for reproduction purposes 82 Compulsory licensing of
significant patents would seem to be a logical duty to impose on a
firm unnaturally accumulating them. In such instances, a licensing
order could hardly be viewed as squelching scientific initiative. 83
normally is not encountered, since most challenged companies produce well beyond the
minimum size needed to achive maximum economies, and any entry barriers are derived
from other sources. See U.S. DEP'T oF JusricE, supra note 329, at 12.
879 Economies of scale could be utilized as the Kennecott decision seemed to do by
"protecting" scarce potential entrants able to achieve those economies required to compete
against firms in the market. However, the difficulty of meaningfully delimiting potential
entrants, to be shown below, augurs against the use of this standard generally. See notes
412-13 and accompanying text infra.
880 Bain found cost advantages in only 3 of the 20 industries he examined. BARRMzs
214.
881 See notes 181-84 and accompanying text supra.
882 See 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1970).
383 In a similar vein, the Neal Commission recommended legislation which would
require a patentee who licenses his patent to one to make that license available to all. Task
Force Report, supra note 378, at 10, 21-23. Professor Jadlow also noted that the Drug
Amendments of 1962 (Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780) contained a provision, which was
deleted before the act's passage, that would have required compulsory licensing of all drug
patents three years after issuance at a predetermined royalty. Jadlow, supra note 81, at 107.
To debilitate the restrictive influences of patents, Kaysen and Turner suggest the insti-
tution of "petty patents" which would run for only 5 years and cover only inventions of
"minor importance." KAYSEN & TuRNER 171-72. They indicate that present patent applica-
tions are not carefully investigated, and that the full 17-year protection is granted to
patents of doubtful originality. Presumably, the 5-year patent would be issued without in-
vestigation as to the originality of the invention. Then, patent office resources could be con-
centrated on the applications for 17-year patents-the type that now substantially inhibit
entry. A 5-year patent would be more bearable, but it must be assumed that a prospectve
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Other cost advantages may demand restriction only in special
instances. The pharmaceutical industry, for example, whose member
firms allegedly-use research and development to block new entry, may
merit unique consideration. s8 Management superiority, on the other
hand, would never seem worthy of restriction. In its theoretically
limitless supply, it is not a true barrier. Even when management su-
periority constitutes a barrier, dilution of this advantage would be an
unwise and probably unworkable policy.8 8 5
High capital requirements pose a threat to entry more frequently
than economies of scale or cost advantages, but often they are due to
an unnecessarily integrated industry. Severing vertical connections in
the industry would serve to lower capital requirements. Workable
remedies could range from invalidating contracts establishing exclu-
sive distributorships, to requiring offending producers to divest a
vertical production link.8 s6 When capital requirements are high for
reasons unrelated to integration, no court remedy could efficiently
lower them. The same policy against reducing scale economies to
induce entry is equally applicable here. Lowering capital requirements
below the level of minimally efficient scale would ultimately cause
price increases which would only injure the public. There may, how-
ever, be legislative or administrative devices for mitigating the effect
of high capital requirements.8 7
patentee, whose purpose is to bar entry, would not qualify for a 17-year patent. See note
359 supra. Unfortunately, this assumption may be unfounded.
There is professional disagreement about actions which impair the patent right.
Professor Williamson's strategy for bifurcating dominant companies would preserve to
them the defense that they became dominant because of existing patents. Williamson,
supra note 50, at 1525. However, he does not treat this defense in sufficient detail to
consider the relatively infrequently encountered condition of excessive patent accumulation.
At the extreme, Professor Armentano regards the patent right as absolute property, any im-
pairment of which would constitute "theft." D. ARmENTANO, supra note 159, at 41-42.
884 Jadlow, supra note 81, at 105.
885 Williamson would allow a dominant firm to rebut the presumption of unlawful
monopolization by proving "continuing, indivisible, absolute management superiority."
Williamson, supra note 50, at 1525.
3886 For example, if a market area's boomerang manufacturer also possesses the only
shellac factory, it would be appropriate to require that factory to shellac the boomerangs
which could only be carved by competitors lacking the capital for a shellacking facility. If
this remedy failed, the next logical step would be to require the divestment of the shellac
factory and its independent establishment to encourage the entry of carvers only, who
would thereafter require less capital to enter.
887 The Small Business Administration, for example, has already provided loans to
small businesses to help relieve concentration. SCHERER 125. There has been a suggestion
to adopt special investment tax deductions for selected industries in order to lessen the
effect of high capital requirements in the industry. Bmam s 215-16. The administering
agency merely would have to decide which industries are uncompetitive for reasons of
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Product differentiation is the greatest deterrent to entry, but it is
the least susceptible to systematic dissipation.88 Apart from measure-
ment difficulties, as a policy matter the trade-off between competitive
regulation and the public interest is not necessarily advantageous.
What must be sacrified for easier entry is the freedom of the public to
make unfettered, if irrational, choices in the marketplace among as
varied a selection as possible. However, elimination of market-chilling
product differences may leave the consumer with a rather dull choice
between products of varying quality, but little aesthetic appeal.38 9
Product differentiation frequently occurs in conjunction with
other barriers. 9 0 For example, the automobile industry is tightly dosed
because of both product differentiation and high capital requirements.
Simply forbidding product differentiation may not bring about new
entry. A prohibition of product differentiation, therefore, would leave
consumers with a smaller range of styles, and the increased competition
necessary to lower prices and improve product quality may not result.8 91
The damaging element of product differentiation is that it raises
costs and lures consumers into purchasing for reasons unrelated to
quality. The de-emphasis of quality simply means that products do not
last as long as they should, consumption generally is increased, and
limited resources are more quickly exhausted. Ecologists warn that
these tendencies must be reversed if this civilization is to avoid col-
lapse.392 When this factor is considered in relation to the regulation
trade-off mentioned previously, a decision to reduce product differen-
tiation is more justified.
Remedies available to existing tribunals include limiting pro-
high capital requirements and then offer incentives accordingly. Although this would
require new legislation, no additional administrative machinery would be needed in
order to determine which industries were noncompetitive. Realistically, most stagnant
industries are well-known to the Justice Department and to the FTC, and have been
catalogued by studies such as those by Bain and Shepherd. These agencies only have to
give their imprimatur to the specific application of the plan. Then, even passively,
without other administrative or judicial interference, more competitive conditions might
be established.
388 See BAIN 459-60. See also Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts-From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285, 360 (1967).
889 But see Mueller, supra note 37, at 38.
890 Osborne concluded that for entry to be "effectively impeded" at least two of the
three primary entry barriers must be found together. Osborne, supra note 96, at 400.
391 However, industry members would then compete on the basis of product quality
rather than exaltation of design frills.
892 See generally D. MYADows, D. MEADows, R. RANDERs & W. BEHRENS, TH lrm
To GRowTH (1972) (predicting decline of civilization within 50 years unless radical changes
in consumption habits and production orientation occur).
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motional expenses to a fixed percentage of revenues393 or a fixed type
of activity,39 forbidding periodic product style modifications 9 5 and
requiring divestment of integrated distributorships. 96 There are also
administrative alternatives for reducing differentiation barriers. As-
suming the FTC firmly acquires the rule-making power, 97 it should
require quality grading and generic labelling s98 and set parameters
for acceptable promotions. 99 More energetic proposals for reducing
differentiation could be accomplished only by legislation.400
Advertising, often placed in the product differentiation category,
can also contribute to all the barriers outlined above. Employed in
a persuasive, rather than informational manner, it exacerbates all the
effects of product differentiation by bringing the nonquality appeal
home to the customer. The basic regulation policy trade-off is not
unlike that for general product differentiation, but advertising seems
898 BARaREs 217.
894 The provision of travelling junkets to physicians to coerce their future endorse-
ment of the sponsor's line of pharmaceutical products would be a type of meretricious
promotion subject to injunction.
895 Shepherd, supra note 106, at 236.
896 BAm nsus 217.
897 In National Petroleum Refineries Ass'n v. FTC, 340 F. Supp. 1343, 1350 (DMD.C.
1972), the district court concluded that the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1970), "does not confer upon the Federal Trade Commission the authority to
promulgate Trade Regulation Rules that have the effect of substantive law." The author
is confident that this situation will be remedied by reversal on appeal or by legislation.
398 See BAIN 459-60.
399 The FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection has undertaken programs relating to
general advertising fairness. See, e.g., FTC, REPORT ON THE AD SUBSTANTIATION PROGRAM
(1972); FTC, PRoPosED Gumns CONCERNING UsE OF ENDORSEMENTS AND TEmTMONiAiLS IN AD-
VERTISING (1972). Insofar as promotions deceive consumers in ways other than advertising,
the FTC may broaden its horizons to cope with these situations. Although the primary
purpose of the Bureau of Consumer Protection is to prohibit deceptive trade practices and
to force competition on the merits of the product, a welcome by-product of its efforts is
a reduction of promotional barriers to entry. Since his promotions are not allowed to un-
fairly lock in the buyer to his product, theoretically a seller cannot insulate himself from
the reasonable promotional efforts of a new competitor.
400 For example, publicly funded product testing laboratories could be established to
assess the quality of consumer goods and to publicize the findings. The Consumers' Union
could serve as a model for any broader effort,
It has also been suggested that firms be taxed more heavily for manufacturing inferior,
nondurable products. Allaby, Allen, Davoll, Goldsmith & Lawrence, Blueprint for Survival,
2 ECOLOOIST, Jan. 1972, at 10. Perhaps it would be more realistic to offer tax incentives
to manufacturers of superior, durable products. Presumably, the application of any such
tax would have to be determined by the analysis of a product testing laboratory of the
type suggested.
A more radical suggestion is essentially to vitiate the Trade-Mark Act of 1946 (ch.
540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 28 U.S.C.)) by allowing "prospective
rivals to copy rather closely the existing marks and names of established firms." Greenhut,
supra note 13, at 329.
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even less deserving of a laissez-faire attitude. Whereas product dif-
ferentiation gives the public the right to shop irrationally, advertising
only gives consumers the right to be exposed to frequently irrational,
coercive messages. 401 Freedom of speech or press probably should not
be stretched to protect the advertisers' attempts to stultify the public.402
The line between informational and persuasive advertising is diffi-
cult to draw, partly because each advertisement usually has elements of
both.403 But any inability to separate these elements should not pre-
clude some control. Advertising generally should be more informative.
It is probably easier to accomplish this than it would be to lessen other
differentiation techniques. The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of
Consumer Protection has made dramatic efforts to control the accuracy
and realism of advertising. 404 The Commission could act summarily to
remove specific offensive advertisements from the media.40 5 With a
firm whose advertising excesses specifically skyrocket the costs of entry,
a broader remedy would be the imposition of a temporary ceiling on
the firm's future outlay for advertising.406 Such a restriction would be
discriminatory, but the same logic used to prohibit United Shoe's
leasing could well apply here. If, through its use of an otherwise legal
401 See generally Turner.
402 In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Court held constitutional a
municipal ordinance which prohibited distribution in the streets of printed handbills
containing advertising matter. The Court noted that although the states and municipalities
may regulate the distribution of information in the streets, they may not impose undue
burdens. Id. The Court maintained, however, "that the Constitution imposes no such
restraint on government as respects purely commercial advertising." Id. See also E.F. Drew
& Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1956).
403 Cf. Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 COLUM. L. Rxv. 401, 411 n.11 (1965).
404 See note 405 infra.
405 See Baum, Antitrust Functions of the Federal Trade Commission: Area Dis-
crimination and Product Differentiation, 24 FED. BJ. 579, 603 (1964). Although the Com-
mission's present advertising rules and guides are not specifically geared to diminishing
persuasive advertising they often have that effect. Two guidelines that could be promul-
gated to limit promotional advertising are: (1) the prohibition of endorsements by all
prominent persons whose prominence lies in an area other than that required for com-
petence to evaluate the product and (2) the prohibition of any advertisement dominated
by a prestige approach to selling the product, particularly to children (i.e., the "be the
first one on your block . . ." formula). These two advertising approaches contribute to
product acceptance for nonquality reasons and hence, from a barrier standpoint, demand
limitation. They also may be "deceptive" in the consumer protection sense.
405 BA=Rms 217. This approach recognizes that persuasive advertising might continue
to be emphasized within the ceiling. To enforce an order allowing only a specific type of
advertising (viz., informational) would require an ability to define the type allowed, as
well as the resources to make frequent quasi-judicial determinations. Therefore, a general
ceiling, plus the Commission's occasional enforcement actions against specific advertise-
ments, may be the most that can be realistically expected. But see Mueller, supra note 37,
at 39-40.
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device, a firm has thrown an industry into a noncompetitive state, and
placed itself in a different, more advantageous position than other
competitors, it is not discriminatory to strip it of that device in order
to allow the industry to establish a more competitive equilibrium.40 7
Furthermore, it seems reasonable to prohibit a merger if advertising-
created entry barriers are likely to be raised. The Procter & Gamble
decision may be criticized for the weakness of evidence, but the wisdom
of limiting the effects of advertising has been at least theoretically borne
out.
Firm size alone should not automatically result in antitrust action
if it is alleged merely to deter entry. An action based solely on firm size
would be a voyage on a ship of conjecture if reliable testimony from
would-be entrants was lacking. For example, in a merger which brings
a large conglomerate into an industry theretofore without a dominant
firm, the immediate inclination might be to issue a complaint alleging,
inter alia, that entry barriers had been raised by the psychological threat
felt by otherwise likely entrants. But sometimes the effect of such entry
is quite the reverse. Competitors and likely competitors may actually
relax because local management expertise and zeal is often lost, and the
parent company may be less interested in aggressively seeking profits
than was the former owner.40 All of this suggests that bigness need
not deter entry. Before any complaints are brought on bigness grounds,
it should be established clearly that identifiable potential entrants have
refused to enter for this reason.409 Insofar as bigness is a direct reflection
of the existence of more traditional economic barriers, the same policies
espoused above with respect to their preservation or attenuation should
apply.410
Courts have shown continual interest in the role of potential entry.
Penn-Olin and El Paso are two cases which illustrate zealous court pro-
tection of possible entrants.41' Perhaps their treatment was an easy
407 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 350 (D. Mass.
1953).
408 This hypothetical is the product of numerous discussions with sfaall businessmen.
409 The author concedes that psychological entry barriers can exist, and that although
not traceable by economic criteria, they may demand attention on rare occasions.
410 The Neal Commission flatly rejected bigness as a criterion for determining anti-
trust violations. The Commission wrote: "Remedial measures based on size alone would
constitute a radical innovation in our antitrust policy and no rationale is available for
determining the appropriate upper limit on the size to which a single firm may grow."
Task Force Report, supra note 378, at 3. The size factor was further undermined by the
Commission's following criticism: "Judicial bias against bigness in the Section 7 sector has
resulted in a retreat from hard economic and legal analysis to the lotus-land of percentage
tests." Id. at 28.
411 See notes 256-66 and accompanying text supra.
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way out of dealing directly with conditions of entry, but what the courts
have done is substitute one difficult problem for another. Indeed, iden-
tifying potential entrants is much more difficult than identifying entry
barriers.412
This approach has shown that courts are uncertain and unknowl-
edgeable about economic realities. The existence of low conditions of
entry is two steps from actual competition. First, potential entrants
must be attracted by low entry conditions, and second, those potential
entrants must enter. If a potential entrant exists, presumably the bar-
riers are low and all he need do is enter and compete. At the edge,
the potential entrant stands for all to see, as the protector of reasonable
prices in the market. However, he cannot enter successfully unless
barriers are permeable. It is this aspect of the barrier problem which
the courts have regarded as insignificant when potential entrants
seemed present.
What the judiciary has sometimes done is imply low conditions
of entry when real or apparent potential entrants are identified. By
not considering the height of entry barriers generally, the courts have
arbitrarily protected known likely entrants while ignoring the impact
of other unforeseen possible entrants. Even the otherwise sound Be-
atrice case leaned on the potential entry crutch by listing several likely
entrants as evidence of the insignificant effect of the merger.413 To
consider potential entrants in lieu of conditions of entry, however, can
be a careless venture. In isolation, the perception of the market's edge
is an unreliable criterion for judging alleged antitrust violations.
Therefore, no suggestion can be made as to the meaningful use of
potential entrant findings.
Any entry barriers which account for noncompetitive conditions
and which are not the product of mergers or conspiracies4 4 may be
assailable under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.415
Because of the untried theory which specific complaints against barrier-
412 See Brodley, supra note 388, at 358-59. An FTC staff study found that, in 1968,
181 of the largest 200 manufacturing corporations conducted business in at least 10
separate product markets. FrC BuRnAu OF EcoNomics, ECONomic REPORT ON CORPORATE
MERGERs, cited in Hearings on Economic Concentration Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 8A, at 224
(1969). This suggests that the number of potential entrants for any single industry,
whether identified or not, may be substantial.
413 See note 306 and accompanying text supra. If potential entry theory is to be
used at all, this may be the proper application.
414 In" which case § 7 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)) and § 1 of the
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)) might respectively apply.
415 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) (unfair methods of competition declared unlawful).
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creating industries might utilize, the more traditionally interpreted
section 2 of the Sherman Act may be less useful at present. However,
the recent Sperry & Hutchinson48 case expanded the scope and broad-
ened the power of the Commission. Under section 5 it is now quite
certain that acts of promotional excess, for example, could be chal-
lenged without a showing of monopolistic structure in the industry.417
The requisite measure of unfairness would be amply proven by the
existence of high barriers to entry empirically demonstrated to have
inhibited the insurgence of new competition. 418
CONCLUSION
The primary role proposed for entry barrier theory is to add a new
dimension to antitrust law enforcement. This would have three effects.
First, it would demand the elevation of barrier theory to a position of
prominence when more traditional criteria fail to lead to a satisfactory
result.419 It is not suggested that barrier analysis should supplant
market share analysis in every instance, only that it should supplement
it when the latter is questionable and supplant it when it is unreliable.
Realistically, complaint counsel should be the first to recognize market
share difficulties and it should be on his initiative that the barrier ques-
tion is fully litigated.
Second, the existence of low entry barriers should be a factor in
antitrust law enforcement. As a policy matter, complaints should not
be brought in industries whose present structural infirmities are likely
to be cured by future entry. If an industry can become more competi-
tive through the natural entry of competitors over time, it is a waste of
resources to attempt to achieve the same end artificially through litiga-
416 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
417 On the limits of the Commission's enforcement of § 5, the Court concluded:
[T]he Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if,
in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard
of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond simply those
enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 244 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
418 Moreover, pricing to inhibit entry may cause a primary-line injury within the
Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970)) and may be enjoinable if discrimination
between customers can be shown. See, e.g., FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 563
(1959).
419 Examples of such cases are Beatrice, where market share information was con-
flicting, and Pabst, where the court's split on geographic market definition made reliance
on market share analysis somewhat unsettling. See notes 21 & 304 and accompanying text
supra. The Commission, at least, has demonstrated some cognizance of barrier theory, as
evidenced by Beatrice. Seemingly, therefore, in this respect barriers already are attracting
long overdue attention.
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tion requiring the same length of time with the additional risk of loss. 420
Once a complaint is issued, the defense of low entry barriers should be
available to defense counsel, for when entry barriers are low, any anti-
competitive effects are likely to be attenuated and the complaint should
be dismissed.42 1
Third, antitrust actions should be brought in some cases solely to
lower entry barriers. This policy could have several ramifications. Sur-
gically precise complaints could be designed to attack specific barrier-
raising practices which bear little relationship to concentration or
monopolization, but which keep prices up and deny entry.422 There
should be a tendency to use the least disruptive remedy that will effec-
tively correct the disorder. In a free economy, emphasis should be on
remedies which simulate as nearly as possible a natural competitive
recovery.423
Such limited actions are likely to be less expensive to bring424 and
may be less zealously fought by the respondent. It will be reasonably
easy to show, for example, the quantity and quality of a respondent's
promotions. They are public by their very nature.425 Less reliance on
economic opinions is needed when concentration considerations are
rejected and a satisfactory standard of excesses is established. Settlement
possibilities should be increased because defendants may be less resis-
tant to the trade-off between the uncertain opportunity to control
future entry and the immediate reduction in costs from a discontinued
barrier-raising program. Also, if these activities are ordered ceased for
an entire industry, the respondent may be yet more willing to settle
since his activities may have been in reaction to others in the industry.
420 See Mueller, supra note 2, at 129; Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A
Suggested Approach, 21 SrAN. L. lrv. 1562, 1593-98 (1969).
421 Low 543-44. Among all the cases examined, only National Steel and Beatrice
leaned heavily on the defense of low entry barriers. Von's Grocery, in ignoring the defense,
is not a persuasive decision, particularly in light of the less than convincing market share
evidence. This defense would also offset the unfairness of present antitrust litigation in
which prosecutors select only the most damaging economic evidence to support a com-
plaint, taking the barrier view only when it serves the government's cause.
422 Without limited barrier actions, the less explosive weaponry needed to fight a
guerilla-like anticompetitive war is lacking. Many promotional activities, which clearly
have anticompetitive effects, cannot be altered by orders of divestment. If such promotion
is successful, it establishes the product in a separate submarket, the bounds of which
contain irrational, but loyal, users. To order a large company to divest a division with
promotional excesses may do nothing, then, to destroy the submarket walis behind
which the product's users remain trapped.
423 See Mueller, supra note 2, at 129.
424 See Posner, supra note 420, at 1597-98.
426 Proof of other entry barriers may also be established with less controversy than
presently surrounds market share determination in many cases.
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A general industry order then has the anomalous, but desirable, appear-
ance of constructive collusion among competitors with an "agreement"
not to conduct business in a certain costly way.
Finally, an action limited to lowering entry barriers may be "half-
a-loaf" in circumstances where a proper action for divestment cannot
practically be brought. Structuralists would, no doubt, suggest the
severance of Ford and Chevrolet Motor Divisions from their parent
companies. But the projected magnitude of the effort-with a likely
expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars, the threat of reprisal
against the political party initiating the complaint by that portion of
the populace supported by those auto makers, and the chance of loss by
the mismatch of powerful Wall Street law firms and auto industry re-
sources against undermanned government staffs with limited funds, and
alternative uses for their resources-has militated against it. If, how-
ever, an action were brought against the big three to limit their design
changes, to require the licensing of some of their protected production
processes, and to disallow exclusive dealerships, the policy considera-
tions might not be nearly so ominous. Even if new entrants were not
induced into the market, the consumer still would be benefited by in-
creased quality competition and perhaps price competition.
In short, an approach to antitrust law enforcement which regularly
includes a consideration of entry barriers opens up new horizons for
the full and fair maintenance of competitive conditions in the market-
place. That expanded consideration should become a reality.
